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ABSTRACT
The passage of the Wagner (National Labor Relations) Act of 1935 represented
an unprecedented effort to guarantee American workers basic labor rights—the
rights to organize unions, to provoke meaningful collective bargaining, and to strike.
Previous attempts by workers and government administrators to realize these rights
in the workplace met with extraordinary, often violent, resistance from powerful
industrial employers, whose repressive measures were described by government offi-
cials as a system of “industrial terrorism.”  Although labor scholars have acknowl-
edged these practices and paid some attention to the way they initially frustrated
labor rights and influenced the jurisprudence and politics of labor relations in the
late 1930s and early 1940s, the literature has neither adequately described the extent
and intensity of this phenomenon nor fully explored its effects.  This Article remedies
that shortcoming.  Focusing on three industries where the practice of industrial ter-
rorism was especially well developed and its influence especially pronounced, this
Article shows how the practitioners of industrial terrorism and their allies in Con-
gress were able to turn the legacy of violence and disorder, which they authored by
their violent resistance to the Wagner Act, into the basis of an extraordinary counter-
attack on labor rights.  It shows how this attack culminated in 1947 with the enact-
ment of the profoundly reactionary Taft-Hartley Act and remade the landscape of
American labor relations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of labor relations in America is a history of conflict and class
struggle mediated by violence.  The first major strike in American history, the
“Great Railroad Uprising” of 1877, resulted in the deaths of scores, perhaps
hundreds, of people.1  Sixty years later, in the summer of 1937, at least sixteen
workers were killed in the “Little Steel” strike—ten shot dead or mortally
wounded on one afternoon near a Republic Steel mill in South Chicago.  In the
sixty years that spanned these events, labor disputes regularly exploded into
bloody conflicts, turning obscure place-names like the Haymarket, Homestead,
Ludlow, Centralia, and Mingo and Logan Counties into enduring symbols of
class conflict.  Although the numbers can only be roughly estimated, these epi-
sodes and others like them probably claimed several thousand lives and left
countless others maimed and traumatized.  They underscore the observation
that “[t]he United States has had the bloodiest and most violent labor history of
any industrial nation in the world.”2
This remarkable history of violence entailed every kind of act imaginable:
beatings or lynchings; chaotic riots and mob violence; arsons, bombings, and
sabotage; assassinations; even military-style skirmishes between armed com-
batants.  People died and were injured not only by the score or the hundreds in
sensational events such as the Great Uprising, but also in countless smaller
clashes that claimed lives and inflicted injuries by the handful.  However
diverse the ways labor violence unfolded, though, the underlying reasons for it
have been consistent and straightforward.
1 Philip Taft & Philip Ross, American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character, and Out-
come, in VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL & COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 187, 190-91
(Hugh Davis Graham & Ted Robert Gurr eds., rev. ed. 1979).
2 Id. at 187, 223.
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Nearly every major outbreak of labor violence revolved around an attempt
by workers to assert basic labor rights—the rights to organize, to provoke col-
lective bargaining, and to strike.  Often, employers used violence and the threat
of violence directly to repress workers.  In other instances, employers first pro-
voked workers to violence by denying them basic labor rights and then used
this pretense to justify attacks on them.  Indeed, employers could regularly
expect the state to abet their use of force against unionists, however contrived
the pretext or culpable the employer.  Governments at all levels lent their police
and militias to the cause of intimidating, assaulting, and arresting strikers.
Moreover, courts and prosecutors made free and creative use of doctrines like
conspiracy, antitrust, and vagrancy, as well as more conventional crimes, to
essentially criminalize labor rights and justify the use of force to deny such
rights, even where the workers asserting them had engaged in no violence at
all.  Until at least the late 1930s, violence functioned in all these ways to the
overwhelming benefit of employers, helping them to build a regime of labor
relations largely bereft of basic labor rights.
The New Deal and the war that followed worked a dramatic structural
transformation of American capitalism accompanied by a fundamentally new
role for the state in labor relations.  Out of this transformation arose for the first
time in American history a regime of laws and administrative structures that
significantly limited the prerogatives of business.  At the center of this new,
reformist political economy was the Wagner Act, the 1935 statute that for the
first time broadly imposed on most employers an obligation to respect workers’
basic labor rights.3
The goal of preempting the violence that had characterized American
labor relations for decades before the New Deal was absolutely central to the
drafters of the Wagner Act.4  As such Congress dedicated the statute to the
intertwined purposes of anchoring a new, Keynesian political economy as well
as establishing a mechanism by which labor conflicts could be resolved in non-
violent ways.5  Not nearly so well appreciated, however, is the degree to which
important episodes of labor violence, which persisted for years after the statute
was enacted, also reshaped the aims and purposes of the new labor law.  In the
decade after its passage, violence became central in a crusade to purge the
Wagner Act of its reformist tendencies and to accomplish a vigorous retrench-
ment of labor rights.
The architects of this campaign to use violence to remake the labor law
were a class of powerful industrial capitalists whose own penchant for violence
provided the very basis of this effort.  Throughout the New Deal era, these
employers embraced a system of organized opposition to basic labor rights.
Although this system entailed various legal and political stratagems, it also fea-
tured well-armed and well-organized corps of private police, industrial spies
and provocateurs, and corrupted public police, all of which threatened,
assaulted, provoked, and even killed workers who attempted to form meaning-
3 See Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 292-93 (1978).
4 See generally 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT,
1935 (1949).
5 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
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ful labor unions or engage in strikes.  This extraordinary program utterly defied
the Wagner Act and persisted in many instances even after the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 1937 landmark decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel upheld the
constitutionality of that legislation.6
Although partly a continuation of earlier traditions of labor repression, this
program was also different.  By the Second New Deal (1935-1941), the practice
of anti-union repression at major industrial employers had become in some
ways as rationalized and premeditated as conventional business operations.
This is reflected, in part, in the extraordinary paraphernalia assembled for the
purpose of anti-union repression.  When the Little Steel Strike began, two of
the companies involved, Republic Steel and Youngstown Sheet & Tube, main-
tained enormous arsenals, including nearly 2,000 firearms.  And at the height of
the strike, these firms controlled some 2,400 armed men and enjoyed the back-
ing of thousands others.  Similarly, on the eve of the famous sit-down strikes of
1936-1937, General Motors maintained a force of company police larger than
that of nearly every city, county, and state in America, as well as hundreds of
labor spies and provocateurs and hundreds of other men under contract with
strikebreaking services.  Ford Motor fought off determined attempts to unionize
its plants for several years after Jones & Laughlin with a “service department”
made up of several thousand thugs whose campaign to terrorize workers
included “whipping grounds” where unionists were regularly assaulted.  Such
means were actually commonplace among industrial employers.  They were
typically used in a coordinated way with other kinds of labor repression,
including not only company unions and the ubiquitous practice of discrimina-
tory discharges, but, even more tellingly, elaborate techniques to convince the
public and political elites alike that the violence produced by these measures
reflected a danger that unions posed to the political and social order, and not
the tyranny and greed of wealthy industrialists.7
In the 1930s and 1940s, both a prominent congressional committee and the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB, or Board) saw fit repeatedly to
describe this organized resistance to labor rights as a system of industrial “ter-
rorism.”8  And terrorism it surely was, perhaps even more fully than the authors
of this term imagined.  For just as contemporary terrorists use violence not only
to inflict direct injuries on their adversaries, but also to elicit dysfunctional
responses to their violent acts, so did industrial terrorists first use violence to
resist the Wagner Act and deny their workers basic labor rights.  They then
used responses to that violence on the part of workers and the NLRB to pro-
mote a reconfiguration of the labor law along conservative lines more appropri-
ate to their own interests.  Although the first part of this stratagem seemed to
fail, the second succeeded in extraordinary ways.  Aided by allies in govern-
6 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 629-30 (1937).
7 See infra Part III.D.
8 See, e.g., In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 306, 306 (1940); In re Ford
Motor Co., 14 N.L.R.B. 346, 354-56 (1939); In re Remington Rand, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 626,
626 (1937); In re Brown Shoe Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 803, 813 (1936); In re Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 503, 516 (1936); S. REP. NO. 77-151, pt. 1 (1939) [hereinafter LIT-
TLE STEEL]; S. REP. NO. 76-6, pt. 3, at 38 (1939) [hereinafter INDUSTRIAL MUNITIONS]; S.
REP. NO. 76-6, pt. 2, at 57, 77-78 (1939) [hereinafter PRIVATE POLICE SYSTEMS].
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ment and the media, these industrialists managed to cast themselves, the ulti-
mate offenders in the field of labor violence, as the victims of malicious unions,
biased NLRB staff, and, ultimately, a too-generous system of labor rights.  The
violence these employers provoked against themselves became the only rele-
vant violence, overshadowing and subverting even the worst carnage inflicted
by employers.  And the prevention of violence, which the drafters of the Wag-
ner Act had viewed as a salient justification for developing a robust regime of
labor rights, evolved into a powerful and enduring reason to compromise those
rights.  This program culminated directly in the Taft-Hartley (Labor-Manage-
ment Relations) Act of 1947, whose radically anti-labor agenda was shaped
directly by this hypocritical counterattack on labor rights.9
Surprisingly, this remarkable history has not been adequately exposed.
Most scholars have been content to assume that employer-sponsored violence
simply failed, or even backfired, in the face of the efforts of audacious union-
ists and diligent NLRB staff.10  So strong is this tendency that even the vio-
lence of the Little Steel Strike, which represents, perhaps, organized labor’s
most tragic defeat of the New Deal era, is repeatedly described as a pyrrhic
victory for employers, who acquiesced to basic dictates of the Wagner Act
within a few years.11  Not all scholars have been blind to the ironies and contra-
dictions of this history, however.  Karl Klare and James Pope stand out among
a very small group of scholars who have thrown light on how the courts used
the litigation of the sit-down strikes to subordinate the Wagner Act’s ostensible
support for labor rights to the norms of labor peace, property, and authority.12
Though immensely valuable, their work in this area has focused only on the sit-
down strikes, which constitute one part of a broader story, and on the strikes’
jurisprudential (as opposed to legislative) consequences.  Likewise, James
Gross’s excellent institutional history of the NLRB very appropriately dis-
cusses how conservatives used the NLRB’s attempts to enforce the law against
virulently (and violently) anti-union employers to frame telling attacks on the
agency and the Wagner Act.13  However, in part because his focus is institu-
tional and otherwise broad-ranging, Gross does not in the end offer a sustained
account of the particular ways that employer repression reshaped the labor
law.14  Rather, along with that of Klare and Pope, Gross’s work invites a more
complete elaboration of this issue.
9 See infra Part III.C.
10 Such is the tone, for example, of Irving Bernstein’s influential and otherwise excellent
study of labor relations in this period, The Turbulent Years. IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE TURBU-
LENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER 1933-1940, at 768-95 (Haymarket
Books 2010) (1969).
11 See, e.g., WALTER GALENSON, THE CIO CHALLENGE TO THE AFL: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT, 1935-1941, at 101-02 (1960); JOSEPH G. RAYBACK, A HIS-
TORY OF AMERICAN LABOR 343-45 (Free Press 1966) (1966); ROBERT H. ZIEGER, THE CIO:
1935-1955, at 62-65 (1995); Taft & Ross, supra note 1, at 224.
12 See generally Klare, supra note 3; Jim Pope, Worker Lawmaking, Sit-Down Strikes, and
the Shaping of American Industrial Relations, 1935-1958, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 45 (2006).
13 See generally JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION 1937-1947 (1981).
14 Id. at 260-67.
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This retelling of the politics of industrial violence also offers a rejoinder to
the notion that remains commonplace among labor scholars and in labor
texts—that the retrenchment of labor rights culminating in the Taft-Hartley Act
somehow represented a “backlash” against the excesses of labor and its sup-
porters in government in the years following the passage of the Wagner Act.
By this account, militant unionists and their supporters pressed too hard against
entrenched employer interests as well as basic American values regarding prop-
erty, class structure, and the workplace; and they advanced radical aims and
embraced militant tactics, especially sit-down strikes and mass picketing,
which ultimately justified and generated support for the retrenchment of labor
rights.15  This notion of backlash collapses when the origins of the attack on
labor rights realized in Taft-Hartley are located in a pattern of violent resistance
to basic labor rights that employers themselves embraced long before workers
pushed back with sit-down strikes, mass pickets, and the like.  The backlash
begins to look more like a deviously executed fallback plan.
This Article draws on a number of sources, including court and adminis-
trative cases, newspaper records, and reports and transcripts from extensive
congressional hearings to demonstrate the important role that industrial terror-
ism played in “unmaking” the Wagner Act.  Especially useful are cases of the
NLRB, as well as the records and reports of the so-called La Follette Commit-
tee of the U.S. Senate, which, over a course of several years in the late 1930s
and early 1940s, conducted penetrating investigations of employers’ violent
opposition to labor rights.  Aside from attempting to reveal the ironic way that
violence was used to alter the basic orientation of labor law and policy, this
Article hopes to reveal how dominant and commonplace employer-sponsored
violence actually was on the industrial landscape of New Deal America.  With
this, it offers a blunt rebuttal to anti-union ideologues who persist in suggesting
that unionists were somehow both the main architects of industrial violence and
its main beneficiaries, when in fact they were neither.
This Article unfolds its argument in three main parts.  Part II offers a rela-
tively brief review of the history of labor violence in the several decades lead-
ing up to 1935, when Congress passed the Wagner Act.  It emphasizes the
important role that violence played in the rise of the so-called “open shop”—a
workplace purged of and defended against union representation—in major
industries during this period.
Part III describes the practice of industrial terrorism as it prevailed in
industrial America from the mid 1930s through the early 1940s.  In so doing,
this Part focuses on events in several industries and employers whose practices
epitomized the dynamics of industrial terrorism and were central in shaping its
legacy.  It begins with the Remington Rand Company, a manufacturing firm
whose well-publicized practices in a 1936 strike anticipated, and whose presi-
dent actually theorized, the strategies used by other industrial employers to
defeat labor rights.  Next, it turns to the automobile industry, with a particular
emphasis on the events surrounding efforts to organize General Motors and
Chrysler, which culminated in the dramatic sit-down strikes of 1936 and 1937,
as well as the more sustained struggle to organize Ford.  Finally, this Part con-
15 See ROBERT SHOGAN, BACKLASH: THE KILLING OF THE NEW DEAL 180-86 (2006).
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siders the steel industry and its efforts to resist Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions’ organizing efforts, particularly in 1936 and 1937, culminating in the
brutal Little Steel Strike.  Among the aims of Part II is to show how company-
sponsored violence not only served to deny workers basic labor rights but also
inspired important expressions of organized worker militancy, including sit-
down strikes, mass picketing, and other violent or disorderly responses.  These
tactics and episodes would form the basis of the reactionary campaign against
labor rights that would be the ultimate legacy of industrial terrorism.
Part IV shows how the violence of these clashes was distorted and rear-
ticulated as evidence of the fundamental excesses of the entire regime of New
Deal labor law.  Recast in these terms, industrial terrorism played a leading role
in framing a counterattack on Wagner Act in the courts and Congress that
began in the late 1930s and came to full fruition in the enactment of Taft-
Hartley.  The final section is a conclusion that reflects briefly on the implica-
tions of this narrative for the way we understand class, violence, and labor
rights in modern society.
II. VIOLENCE AND LABOR REPRESSION IN THE PRE-WAGNER ACT PERIOD
In the course of its landmark investigation of industrial violence in the late
1930s, the La Follette Committee repeatedly acknowledged that many means of
labor repression it brought to light had been in regular use for more than a half
century prior to the Great Depression.  In fact, as the committee also recog-
nized, its own investigations followed a number of earlier investigations of vio-
lence in industrial America.16  Together, these studies revealed how
consistently industrial violence served the purposes of labor repression, even as
the violence itself often seemed chaotic and anarchical.17  As this Article
shows, violence repeatedly took the form of a calculated effort, backed by a
willingness to use and provoke violence, to deny workers the right to organize,
bargain, or strike.  The result was a deeply ironic process by which a mythic
and contradictory ideology of workplace liberty—set upon the concepts of the
“open-shop” and its adjunct, the “right to work”—was built on a foundation of
force and coercion.
At Congress’s direction, the Commission on Industrial Relations con-
ducted the most important of these earlier investigations between 1912 and
1915.18  The Commission determined that employers often intentionally
engaged in or knowingly cultivated industrial violence, and the primary reason
they did so was not to defend the peace or even some fundamentalist view of
property rights, but rather to deny workers basic labor rights.19  Strikes them-
selves typically originated from employers’ refusal to recognize or bargain with
16 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 35-36; INDUSTRIAL MUNITIONS, supra note 8, at 2-3;
PRIVATE POLICE SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at 4-11; S. REP. NO. 76-6, pt. 1, at 5 (1939) [herein-
after STRIKEBREAKING SERVICES].
17 INDUSTRIAL MUNITIONS, supra note 8, at 1-3; PRIVATE POLICE SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at
4-11; STRIKEBREAKING SERVICES, supra note 16, at 1-2.
18 JOSEPH A. MCCARTIN, LABOR’S GREAT WAR: THE STRUGGLE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEMOC-
RACY AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN LABOR RELATIONS, 1912-1921, at 24 (1997).
19 S. REP. NO. 64-415, at 96 (1916) [hereinafter INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS].
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unions, or even accept their right to exist, and from their penchant to enforce
these positions by repressive tactics, including spying, discharges and black-
lists, and assaults.  Once workers went on strike, they faced another array of
repressive tactics, anchored by the practice of strikebreaking.  For many
employers, strikebreaking was not simply a means of keeping their businesses
open while a strike was pending, or of protecting their property, but a strategy
for drawing strikers into violent conflict.20  Employers typically hired strike-
breakers to provoke strikers to violence in order to give the employer license to
break up the pickets with private police or compliant public police.  The Com-
mission determined that most union-sponsored violence could be explained in
terms of this logic of provocation.21
Despite some instances of serious, unprovoked union violence and other
instances when unionists grossly overacted, the pattern described by the Com-
mission, whereby such violence was usually provoked in some way and of
understandable proportion, largely held true through the New Deal era.  Nor did
employers always wait for unionists to strike or bother first to provoke them.
On many occasions, employers locked out workers preemptively, as a prequel
to greater provocation.22  Others orchestrated blatant attacks on picket lines or
other gatherings of workers or arranged to have union leaders and organizers
assaulted or even assassinated.  These methods functioned in concert with a
broader program of holding the threat of violence over workers as a deterrent to
the exercise of labor rights, and using violence in any case as a means of dis-
crediting unionists and justifying their repression and exploitation.23
The conclusions of the Commission on Industrial Relations were affirmed
by another major investigation of industrial violence several years later.  The
author of the study was the Interchurch World Movement (Interchurch), and its
focus was the Great Steel Strike of 1919.24  The Great Steel Strike was the
largest strike up to that time, entailing a several-month walkout of 250,000 to
365,000 wage earners in the basic steel industry, and it provoked repression on
a scale to match.25  In the course of the strike, steel companies used tens of
thousands of company guards, deputies, and public police forces under their
direction to demolish picket lines, intimidate workers, and ultimately defeat a
determined effort to establish union representation in the industry.26  In the
course of the strike, about twenty people, most of them workers, were killed;
hundreds, maybe thousands, were injured; and countless others were arrested,
threatened, and literally terrorized.27  The Interchurch investigation attributed
the cause of the strike to a desire by workers to redress oppressive and exploita-
20 Id. at 93-94.
21 Id.
22 See Taft & Ross, supra note 1, at 214.
23 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 19, at 93, 153-54; SIDNEY LENS, THE LABOR WARS:
FROM THE MOLLY MAGUIRES TO THE SITDOWNS 273-321(1973).
24 See generally INTERCHURCH WORLD MOVEMENT OF N. AM., REPORT ON THE STEEL
STRIKE OF 1919 (1920).
25 DAVID BRODY, LABOR IN CRISIS: THE STEEL STRIKE OF 1919, at 113 (1965).
26 See generally id.
27 See WILLIAM Z. FOSTER, THE GREAT STEEL STRIKE AND ITS LESSONS 223 (Da Capo
Press 1971) (1920); Taft & Ross, supra note 1, at 214.
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tive conditions in the industry.28  It attributed the strike’s widespread violence
to the concerted campaign by steel companies (under the leadership of U.S.
Steel) and their allies in government to use force to break up pickets and to
provoke and demoralize the strikers.29
An important theme in the Interchurch report was the way the steel com-
panies and their allies used anti-radical propaganda, pregnant with allusions to
the threat of worker-sponsored violence, against the strikers.  By loudly accus-
ing the strikers of being Communists and anarchists, they were able both to
further provoke the strikers and to discredit them and justify physical attacks
and other forms of repression.30  Of course, such red-baiting tactics were not
entirely new.  For more than a decade, the Industrial Workers of the World
(IWW) had been harassed, assaulted, and, on a few occasions, killed by com-
pany agents and police who routinely justified their actions by reference to the
IWW’s explicitly radical agenda.31  What distinguished the use of anti-radical
propaganda in the Great Steel Strike was that the steel strikers’ aims were not
radical; they sought only recognition of their union as well as modest improve-
ments in employment conditions.32  But the strike showed that charges of radi-
calism could be used effectively regardless.
Over the next few years, violence continued to define the limits of labor
rights across the industrial landscape.33  In addition to violence, threats of vio-
lence, and violence-related propaganda, employers also employed tactics that
were softer and more pernicious.  Among these were home mortgage and insur-
ance programs, and other instruments of “welfare capitalism” that bound work-
ers to their jobs and therefore muted their tendency to protest.34  Another
approach was the aggressive and increasingly skillful promotion of the “open
shop” concept as the proper American ideology, in contrast to the supposedly
foreign and radical concept of independent unionism.35  In this role, the con-
cept would have a particularly insidious function; for like its cousin, the right to
work, the literal connotations of the open shop—free choice in whether to
belong to a union—were distant from its actual meaning, which was employ-
ers’ active opposition to labor rights.  And yet these concepts proved remarka-
bly resonant, particularly when also married to charges of union-sponsored
violence.36
Employers of the period also continued to make use of a legal regime
centered on the labor injunction and anti-trust laws that, although not entirely
28 INTERCHURCH WORLD MOVEMENT OF N. AM., supra note 24, at 11-16, 246-50.
29 Id. at 11-16.
30 Id. at 31-38.
31 On the repression of the IWW, see MELVYN DUBOFSKY, WE SHALL BE ALL: A HISTORY
OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD (Joseph A. McCartin ed., 2000); Ahmed A.
White, The Crime of Economic Radicalism: Criminal Syndicalism Laws and the Industrial
Workers of the World, 1917-1927, 85 OR. L. REV. 649, 650 (2006).
32 BRODY, supra note 25, at 114.
33 IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1920-
1933, at 1-43 (Haymarket Books 2010) (1969); Taft & Ross, supra note 1, at 216-17.
34 See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 90; ROBERT H. ZIEGER, AMERICAN WORKERS,
AMERICAN UNIONS, 1920-1985, at 3-10 (1986).
35 BERNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 147-49.
36 Id.  at 147-48, 153-56.
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preclusive of basic labor rights, nevertheless subjected every attempt to strike
or engage in meaningful collective bargaining to the risk of criminal prosecu-
tion and injunction.37  The 1920s likewise featured a more explicit kind of legal
repression: a focused campaign of legal persecution by which hundreds of radi-
cal unionists were systematically prosecuted and imprisoned for violating state
“criminal syndicalism” law that barred advocacy of “industrial or political
reform” by means of “sabotage, violence or other unlawful methods of
terrorism.”38
The dominant labor organization of the period, the American Federation
of Labor (AFL), did itself little credit in the face of these practices.  Indeed,
most AFL unions were hardly vibrant enough to justify employer repression,
for during this period, organizing efforts of AFL unions were consistently deri-
sory and often incompetent.39  Moreover, as a rule, the federation stubbornly
adhered to a program that excluded most blacks, foreigners, and women; it
defended a system of craft unionism that excluded virtually the entire industrial
workforce; and it failed to articulate a compelling critique of the conditions of
labor in industrial America.40
In the 1920s, these factors combined to dramatically erode even the mod-
est gains in membership and influence that organized labor had won in the
preceding decades.  Despite considerable growth in the overall size of the
workforce, total union membership declined from just more than 5 million in
1920 to less than 3.5 million in 1929.41  During this time, entire unions disap-
peared completely, and many others were reduced to shadows of their former
selves.42  The same factors—repression and the ineptitude of the AFL—dra-
matically diminished the ability of those unions that did retain reasonable mem-
bership to mount effective protests and engage in meaningful collective
bargaining.43  These effects were particularly pronounced in mass-production
industries, as well as in transportation and mining.  Following a pattern estab-
lished in the steel industry, employers created and defended open-shop empires
that extended across entire industries encompassing millions of workers, even
as these workers continued to face intensely authoritarian and exploitative con-
ditions that exposed the true implications of the open shop and the right to
work.44
As unfavorable as organized labor’s situation already was at the close of
the 1920s, its condition actually worsened significantly in the first years of the
Great Depression.  Initially, the erosive factors just listed were aggravated by
unprecedented levels of unemployment, underemployment, and reductions in
overall wages.  As a result, union membership fell even further, as did organ-
ized labor’s overall influence.45
37 Id. at 190-215; William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1148-95 (1989).
38 White, supra note 31, at 706.
39 BERNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 83-108.
40 See ZIEGER, supra note 34, at 5.
41 BERNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 84.
42 Id. at 84-87.
43 Id.
44 See id. at 56-74, 84-90.
45 See id. at 334-57.
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At the same time, however, the first years of the 1930s also saw the emer-
gence of other factors that would eventually position industrial workers to
finally challenge employer hegemony.  Principle among these was the Depres-
sion itself, which sowed such unprecedented social devastation that workers
began to defy the normal tendency to retreat from activism during economic
downturns.46  There was also the effect of the New Deal—the First New Deal
of 1933-1935—which featured several attempts to protect basic labor rights.47
The most important of these was section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recov-
ery Act (the NIRA, 1933), which specifically validated the right to organize
and engage in collective bargaining, and gave birth to a sequence of administra-
tive entities dedicated to enforcing these rights.48  Although measures like sec-
tion 7(a), which consistently lacked adequate structures for enforcement,
proved ineffective as means of directly advancing labor rights, they were
important in changing the climate of labor relations.  By signaling some degree
of government support for unionization, they emboldened workers and unions
to press their organizing goals.49  Likewise, they gave renewed credence to the
idea, which had been for so long negated by anti-labor propaganda and decades
of government-sponsored and government-aided repression, that labor rights
could be realized by a program focused in part on political participation and
activism.50
It would be a mistake, however, to focus unduly on the immediate effects
of the Depression or the New Deal legal regime in explaining changing labor
relations in the 1930s.  Other factors indigenous to the working class were at
least as important.  Principle among these was a building movement from
within the AFL to qualify the organization’s commitment to craft unionism in
an effort to organize the masses of (often low-skilled) industrial workers in the
open shop industries.51  Initially, this took form in a clumsy, but not entirely
ineffective, attempt to charter “federal” labor unions with jurisdiction to organ-
ize in a semi-industrial fashion.52  Such unions tended to flourish briefly before
withering in the face of employer repression and intransigence, and renewed
jurisdictional rivalries.53  However, by 1935 a very tentative coalition was
emerging that brought together the interest in genuine industrial unionism
among mainstream unionists with that of radicals, including former IWW
members, socialists, and most importantly, members and fellow travelers of the
Communist Party.54  Within the AFL, this impulse manifested itself in the
emergence of a powerful insurgent movement, which by late 1935 had given
rise to the Committee of Industrial Organizing (later, Congress of Industrial
46 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 38-39.
47 On other attempts to legislate labor reforms during this period, see 1 JAMES A. GROSS,
THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: A STUDY IN ECONOMICS, POLIT-
ICS, AND THE LAW 64-69 (1974); BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 192-97.
48 ZIEGER, supra note 34, at 28-29.
49 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 172-73.
50 Id. at 347-55; ZIEGER, supra note 34, at 28-29.
51 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 94-96.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 94-95, 354-91.
54 Id. at 170; ROBERT S. MCELVAINE, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: AMERICA, 1929-1941, at
203-04 (2009).
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Organizations, or CIO).55  Although never very prominent within either the
AFL or CIO bureaucracies, radicals were peppered throughout the lower ranks
of leaders and organizers, especially in the CIO.56  There, they would play a
pivotal role in an all-out effort by the CIO to challenge the open shop in trans-
portation, extractive, and mass-production industries.57
In the meantime, the modest changes in the role of the state and the law in
labor relations embodied in the NIRA did little to alter employers’ contempt for
labor rights, particularly in these open shop strongholds.  Indeed, the reaction
of most employers in these industries toward the section 7(a)—and the new
labor boards hastily created to enforce it—was to ignore them, even to the point
of contemptuously flouting their jurisdiction.58 As events quickly proved, the
same employers remained equally prepared to use violence to deny basic labor
rights.
The 1930s had opened with an escalation of violence in eastern coal coun-
try as well as widespread attacks on agricultural workers and organizers in Cal-
ifornia and the South.59  A large but unknown number of workers and
organizers lost their lives in struggles to organize agriculture, which remained a
redoubt of the open shop well beyond the New Deal period.60  And there were
also important clashes in industrial regions.  In March 1932, about fifty workers
and their supporters were shot and four killed by police and company guards at
a protest against hunger and unemployment at the main gate of Ford’s River
Rouge mega-plant in Dearborn, Michigan.61  The year 1934 alone featured a
number of bloody labor battles, among them a massive waterfront strike in San
Francisco, a general strike in Minneapolis, and a strike by workers at a Toledo
automobile parts factory, which each left several people dead and scores
injured.62  Bloodier still was a massive textile strike that year, which extended
through the entire Appalachian region and involved more than four hundred
thousand workers; it resulted in the deaths of more than a dozen people.63
Overall, labor violence in the early and middle years of the Depression proba-
bly claimed several hundred lives, most of them strikers and strike support-
ers.64  At the same time that these tragic episodes underscored the strength of
the open shop, they also gave dramatic testament to the fact that millions of
55 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 401; ZEIGER, supra note 34, at 30-34.
56 FRASER M. OTTANELLI, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE
DEPRESSION TO WORLD WAR II 140-53 (1991).
57 On the rise of the CIO, see generally ZIEGER, supra note 11.  On the role of Communists
in organizing industrial labor, see OTTANELLI, supra note 56, at 144-153.
58 GROSS, supra note 47, at 23-25, 42-43, 91-93.
59 Taft & Ross, supra note 1, at 218-19.
60 STUART MARSHALL JAMIESON, LABOR UNIONISM IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 290-312
(Arno Press 1976) (1946); CAREY MCWILLIAMS, FACTORIES IN THE FIELD: THE STORY OF
MIGRATORY FARM LABOR IN CALIFORNIA 211-29 (Archon Books 1969) (1939); Taft & Ross,
supra note 1, at 219.
61 OTTANELLI, supra note 56, at 33-34; BERNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 432-34.
62 Taft & Ross, supra note 1, at 221-22; Rebecca E. Zietlow & James Gray Pope, The
Toledo Auto-Lite Strike of 1934 and the Fight Against “Wage Slavery,” 38 U. TOL. L. REV.
839, 845-46 (2007).
63 Taft & Ross, supra note 1, at 221.
64 LENS, supra note 23, at 273; Taft & Ross, supra note 1, at 217-23.
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unorganized workers were increasingly prepared to challenge the prevailing
industrial order.
III. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INDUSTRIAL TERRORISM IN THE SECOND
NEW DEAL PERIOD
On paper, the passage of the Wagner Act in June 1935 signaled a veritable
revolution in the state of labor rights in America.  More explicitly than any part
of the NIRA or any other statute in the country’s history, the new law unequiv-
ocally declared that workers enjoyed the right to form unions, engage in mean-
ingful collective bargaining, and strike.  Even more remarkably, other
provisions of the Wagner Act established a system for protecting these rights
against employer interference, with an independent administrative agency, the
NLRB, established for this purpose.65  The new law appeared to supplant more
than fifty years of anti-labor laws and policies, as well as an equally entrenched
tradition of extra-legal resistance to labor rights.
In reality, it remained unclear what, if any, effect the Wagner Act would
have.  Only a month before it was passed, the Supreme Court had declared the
NIRA unconstitutional in terms that strongly suggested it might eventually visit
the same fate on the Wagner Act.66  Open shop employers were confident that
the Court would eventually relieve them of any obligations under the new
law.67  Calculating that the statute’s chances in the Court would be diminished
further if it were already reduced to a dead letter in practice, these employers
actually intensified repression in and around their plants and mills.  In this con-
text, many open shop employers came to view their struggle against the statute
with an almost religious conviction, giving witness to how completely they
embraced their own ideology.
As this section reveals, open shop employers stepped up the use of black-
lists and other forms of open discrimination, sham company unions, espionage,
and, of course, violence.  To be sure, the Wagner Act and other conditions of
the New Deal did change somewhat how violence was used to resist labor
rights.  Although the use of public police and militias against workers did not
necessarily diminish, having more public officials responsive to the interests of
organized labor meant that initiating the use of such forces, as by the time-tried
provocation of union-sponsored violence, had to be accomplished more care-
fully.68  And even as the ham-fisted use of public forces likely diminished,
employers intensified the use of other tactics, especially company unions—
even though these were manifestly unlawful under the Wagner Act.  They also
bolstered their own capacity to visit violence on their workers.  These employ-
ers developed larger, better-organized, and better-armed corps of company
police and spies, and they used these forces with greater planning and foresight.
65 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
66 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554-55 (1935).
67 GROSS, supra note 47, at 149, 171-73.
68 See ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA: 1870 TO
THE PRESENT 209-11 (1978).
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A. Industrial Terrorism Fully Theorized: The “Mohawk Valley Formula”
In the late spring of 1936, an AFL union representing about six thousand
workers called a strike against Remington Rand, Inc. (Remington Rand), a
manufacturer of office equipment headquartered in Buffalo and New York City
and with plants in Upstate New York, Ohio, and western New England.69
Within a few months, the company crushed the strike by means of a sophisti-
cated array of manipulative and repressive tactics that the company’s president,
James Rand, would call the “Mohawk Valley Formula” after the location of
one of the struck plants.70  The nature of this formula and its effect on the strike
are interesting for several reasons.  First, the formula itself, and the fact that it
was publicized as a formula, highlight the degree to which labor repression had
become rationalized in the New Deal era.  Second, the success with which
Remington Rand used the formula shows how effective such repressive tech-
niques could be.  Third, the Mohawk Valley Formula was eventually presented
as a guide to other employers in how to resist labor rights and, as we shall later
see, may have actually served this purpose.  Finally, the formula contemplated
an underlying strategy for exploiting the provocation of union violence on a
local level that directly anticipated how employers and their allies would later
use the whole history of violence in this era to frame a far broader counterat-
tack on labor rights.
The union involved in the Remington Rand dispute, the Joint Board of
Office Equipment Workers, emerged like many others in the ferment created by
section 7(a) of the NIRA.71  It actually attempted unsuccessfully to vindicate its
right to recognition and collective bargaining under the clumsy administrative
machinery created to enforce that provision.  This led the union to strike at
several Remington Rand plants in May 1934.72  Surprisingly, the strike ended
in an agreement between the union and the company covering most of its man-
ufacturing plants, which in turn led to a period of relatively quiet labor relations
from late 1934 through most of 1935.73  However, in the fall of 1935, the com-
pany undertook to reorganize its operations in a way that entailed the removal
of production from unionized factories to a new, non-unionized facility.74  This
prompted the union to press company management for clarification of the com-
pany’s plans and to explain how these plans were consistent with the existing
union contract.75  The dispute over this issue, which merged with a conflict
over wages, became increasingly hostile, with the company refusing to answer
the union’s requests for information or even to meet with its representatives.76
Even before the 1936 strike commenced, Remington Rand had begun to
execute its strikebreaking formula.  Its tactics in the days leading to the strike
included preemptive (and pretextual) lockouts at several of the affected plants,
targeted firings of union leaders, changes in pay and benefits to penalize strik-
69 In re Remington Rand, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 626, 627-31 (1937).
70 Id. at 659, 721.
71 Id. at 632.
72 Id. at 633.
73 Id. at 633-34.
74 Id. at 634-38.
75 Id. at 637-38.
76 Id. at 635-42.
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ers, and deceptive and coercive polling designed to create a false impression
that the union lacked the support of the rank and file.77  The company also
hired the services of four professional strikebreaking services notorious for
their provocative and unlawful methods.78  When the strike began on May 26,
1936, it substantially shut down the company’s operations.79  At that point,
Rand, who said he would defy the strikers “at all costs,” deployed his formula
in full.80
The NLRB would eventually find evidence of a vast number of practices
aimed at demoralizing and “terrorizing” the union, as well as undermining its
support among the populations around the plants and the officials in charge of
the communities.  In fact, these findings merely proved the company to have
done what James Rand had already admitted.81  For example, on June 12, 1936,
with the strike already showing some weakness, Rand gave a speech in Ilion,
New York, in which he boasted how he invented the Mohawk Valley Formula
and used it successfully to break the strike.  Rand laid out the key elements of
the formula and urged other employers to make use of it against unions
organizing their workers.82  The next day, a representative of the National
Association of Manufacturers (NAM) arrived in Ilion to interview Rand.  A
week later, the NAM published a narrative summary of Rand’s formula in its
Labor Relations Bulletin.83
As dissected by the Board the formula devised by Rand consisted of nine
major steps: First, conduct a propaganda campaign against the union centered
on labeling its organizers “agitators” and fronted by a “citizens committee” of
the employer’s own creation.84  Second, when the strike begins, charge that the
strike poses a threat to law and order, regardless of whether it poses any such
threat.85 Third, hold a mass meeting under the aegis of the citizens committee
designed to pressure local authorities and to initiate vigilante activities.86
Fourth, constitute a “large armed police force to intimidate the strikers and to
exert a psychological effect upon the citizens” as well as incite violence and
disorder among the strikers and generally convince the strikers’ that their cause
is hopeless.  The force would be composed of whatever array of local police
and state police, vigilantes, and “special deputies,” that might prove conve-
nient.87  Fifth, organize a “back to work” movement and represent it to the
public and the strikers as proof of the strike’s impending failure and its
undemocratic character.88  Sixth, prepare a staged reopening of the struck busi-
ness, complete with an impressive show of armed guards, with the idea of fur-
77 Id. at 644-48.
78 STRIKEBREAKING SERVICES, supra note 16, at 117-19.
79 In re Remington Rand, 2 N.L.R.B. at 648; Strike in 6 Plants of Remington Rand, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 1936, at 3.
80 Strike in 6 Plants of Remington Rand, supra note 79.
81 In re Remington Rand, 2 N.L.R.B. at 626.
82 Id. at 659.
83 Id. at 659-64.
84 Id. at 664.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 665.
88 Id.
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ther demoralizing the strikers while also creating the impression with the public
that they are only able to keep the business closed by force and intimidation.89
Seventh, conduct the “reopening” with great spectacle, fanfare, and patriotic
symbolism.90  Eighth, increase the presence of the armed guards, if necessary
turning the area “into a warlike camp” and creating “a state of emergency”
designed to deter outside supporters from coming to the union’s aid and further
emphasizing the futility of the union’s campaign.91  Finally, announce that the
strike has been broken—even if it had not been—and that any remaining resis-
tance is the work of a minority hostile to the majority’s “right to work.”92  The
NLRB’s published opinion in its case against Remington Rand demonstrated
how the company executed every one of these steps.93
For obvious reasons, at least as it was related by Rand and the NAM, the
formula did not endorse the deliberate use of force against strikers.  Not explic-
itly, at least—but the prospect of employer-sponsored violence was clearly
contemplated by the central idea of assembling armed forces and using them
aggressively to intimidate, provoke, and demoralize striking workers.  It is easy
to see how the eventuality of open violence would not only likely follow but, if
it did, would actually vastly enhance the effectiveness of a program keyed
toward building a climate of emergency and presenting this as the ultimate fault
of irresponsible radicals and unwanted outsiders.  In fact, the whole scheme
would tend to work best if the implied threat of violence were used to dissuade
workers from ever striking in the first place.  This would follow not only for the
obvious reason that some strikes would be prevented altogether, but also
because the strikes that did occur notwithstanding such threat would likely be
edgy, insecure affairs, especially quick to respond in one way or another to
employer provocations.
In the course of the Remington Rand strike, the company’s application of
the formula several times resulted in serious violent outbreaks.  The strike-
breaking firms hired by the company provided approximately five hundred
armed guards distributed among the handful of towns where the strike was
centered.94  Together with hundreds more special deputies and armed vigilantes
organized under the auspices of local citizens committees, the guards patrolled
the towns, denying strikers and their supporters the right to picket or even pass
89 Id. at 665-66.
90 Id. at 666.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 664-66.  For more information on Rand’s tactics, see Hiring 500 to End Syracuse
Strike, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1936, at 10; Pickets Are Orderly at Remington Rand, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 1936, at 5; Police Will Protect Remington Workers, N.Y. TIMES, May 28,
1936, at 13; Rand Is Optimistic on Strike Trends, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1936, at 3; Rand
Pickets Curbed, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1936, at 25; Rand Strike Writ Upheld on Appeal, N.Y
TIMES, Aug. 19, 1936, at 11; Remington Fails to Win Strikers, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1936, at
12; Remington Rand Drops 3 Plants, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1936, at 16; Remington Rand
Moves Machines, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1936, at 35; Six Rand Factories Guarded in Strike,
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1936, at 3.
94 In re Remington Rand, 2 N.L.R.B. at 708; STRIKEBREAKING SERVICES, supra note 16, at
119-23.
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freely on the streets.95  Along with staged re-openings, these tactics provoked a
number of clashes.96  In early June, for example, a staged provocation at Tona-
wanda, New York, involving phony replacement workers and police resulted in
a huge street fight with strikers and strike sympathizers.97  In mid-August,
guards employed by Remington Rand shot two strikers in Syracuse.98  Later
that month at the same Syracuse plant, professional strikebreakers led five hun-
dred men armed with “guns, clubs, sticks, blackjacks, and other weapons” in an
attack on a group of four union picketers and two hundred union bystanders.99
Fortunately, no one was killed in these skirmishes.  However, consistent with
Rand’s scheme, they likely undermined strike support among the public and the
unionists alike and gave impetus to the company’s efforts to secure police inter-
vention and court injunctions against the picketers.100
A year after the strike was broken, the NLRB found Remington Rand
guilty of a host of unfair labor practices and ordered the company to rehire the
nearly four thousand strikers who had been replaced by scabs during the strike
and not allowed to return to their positions afterward.101  The Board also
required the company to disestablish company-controlled unions set up during
the strike and to recognize and bargain with the bona fide union.102  But these
remedies were enforced only after several more years of delay occasioned by
the company’s very aggressive attempt first to enjoin the Board’s NLRB’s pro-
ceedings and later to simply deny its authority.103  Even after the Supreme
Court rejected its appeals, it still took a threat of contempt proceedings to get
the company to comply with the Board’s orders.104  Rand himself frustrated
earlier attempts at mediation by U.S. Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, as
well as similar efforts by the governors of the affected states.105  He and one of
his strikebreaking agents would later be charged with (but acquitted on techni-
cal grounds) of violating a federal law prohibiting the use of interstate strike-
breaking services to interfere with peaceful labor picketing.106  The La Follette
95 In re Remington Rand, 2 N.L.R.B. at 654; STRIKEBREAKING SERVICES, supra note 16, at
119-23.
96 On clashes during the strike, see STRIKEBREAKING SERVICES, supra note 16, at 120-23; 3
Buses Wrecked by Rand Strikers, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1936, at 2; Bus Attacked in Strike,
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1936, at 9; Workers Stoned in Ohio Rand Strike, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,
1936, at 12.
97 In re Remington Rand, 2 N.L.R.B. at 668.
98 2 Shot in Rand Strike; Troops May Be Asked, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1936, at 4.
99 In re Remington Rand, 2 N.L.R.B. at 681.
100 Id. at 730-37; STRIKEBREAKING SERVICES, supra note 16, at 119-23.
101 In re Remington Rand, 2 N.L.R.B. at 737-39; Remington Rand Defies U.S. Board, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 1937, at 1.
102 In re Remington Rand, 2 N.L.R.B. at 737-39.
103 NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576
(1938); see also Remington Rand Defies U.S. Board, supra note 101.
104 Remington Rand, Inc., Bows to NLRB Order, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1940, at 15.
105 On Perkins’ efforts, see Rand Peace Terms Signed in Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,
1937, at 3; Rand to Discuss Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1937, at 8.  On the governors’
efforts, see Lehman Backs Cross in Rand Peace Move, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1936, at 18;
New Violence Marks Strike in Rand Plants, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1936, at 24.
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Committee took the case as salient proof of the strikebreaking law’s
inadequacy.107
The Board and the La Follette Committee would later surmise that the
Mohawk Valley Formula was studied and adopted by other employers’ intent
on breaking strikes, including the Little Steel companies whose tactics are
described below.108  The claim is certainly plausible, but for obvious reasons
impossible to prove one way or the other.  It is also at least somewhat debatable
on its merits, in that it seems unlikely that the Little Steel companies actually
needed much tutelage in the business of labor repression.  What is not debata-
ble is that the systematic nature of Rand’s formula reflected an increasingly
sophisticated approach to labor repression among powerful industrial employ-
ers in the Second New Deal era.  If they were not genetically related to the
Mohawk Valley Formula, these other programs at least gave proof to the con-
cept of convergent evolution in this realm.
B. Organized Violence and Labor Repression in the Automobile Industry
In 1936, automobile production was the largest industry in America by
value of its product and twelfth largest by number of employees.109  The indus-
try was already dominated by the “Big Three.”  General Motors (GM) had by
then attained the position it would occupy for much of the post-War period as
the world’s largest private enterprise.110  In the mid-1930s, it employed more
than two hundred thousand workers and produced nearly 40 percent of all cars
and trucks in the world.111  Though not so large as GM, Chrysler and Ford
were formidable concerns: each employed roughly one hundred thousand
workers and between them they produced around two million vehicles per
year.112  Ford was further distinguished by the fact that the entire business was
still the personal property of Henry Ford, his wife, and his son.113  All of these
companies maintained extensive vertically integrated operations that included
shipping and rail operations, raw materials sources and processing facilities, as
well as assembly plants.114
1. Violence and the Open Shop in the Automobile Industry
Each of these companies—GM, Chrysler, and Ford—was also stridently
committed to the open shop.  In open defiance of their statutory obligations
under NIRA and the Wagner Act, and of the authority of the boards created to
enforce these laws, the companies defended their position with a machinery of
repression that relied on espionage, propaganda, discriminatory discharges, and
107 Id.
108 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 478.
109 In re Ford Motor Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 621, 625 (1937).
110 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 510-11.
111 SIDNEY FINE, SIT-DOWN: THE GENERAL MOTORS STRIKE OF 1936-1937, at 20-23 (1969).
112 ZIEGER, supra note 11, at 53; In re Ford Motor, 4 N.L.R.B. at 623-25; In re Chrysler
Corp., 13 N.L.R.B. 1303, 1307 (1939).
113 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 734-36; In re Ford Motor, 4 N.L.R.B. at 623 n.2.
114 In re Chrysler, 13 N.L.R.B. at 1307; In re Ford Motor, 4 N.L.R.B. at 624; FINE, supra
note 111, at 20-22.
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company unions, as well as threats and brute force.115  These practices were
meticulously documented by both the NLRB and the La Follette Committee.
Among the more salient determinations is the La Follette Committee’s revela-
tion that GM maintained at its plants a full-time staff of 1,400 well-armed and
well-trained company police, backed by an indeterminate number of part-time
police.116  Moreover, GM fielded what the committee called an “amazing and
terrifying” corps of spies charged with spying on, provoking, and generally
frustrating workers trying to organize at its plants.117  The company itself main-
tained a force of about two hundred spies, but like most other large manufactur-
ers it also obtained espionage services by contract.118  At one point in the mid-
1930s, GM had more than a dozen such firms under contract.119  GM and
Chrysler were actually the largest clients of two of the most notorious labor
“detective” agencies, Pinkerton and Corporations Auxiliary.120  And this was
not all.  Such professional spies in turn invariably coerced and cultivated net-
works of informants called “hooked men.’’121  Although these many layers of
operatives made it difficult for investigators to say how many spies these com-
panies actually used, the numbers were clearly enormous.  Indeed, GM
employed so many spies from so many sources that it was reduced to hiring
spies to spy on its spies.122
By the 1930s, these assets were much in use at GM and the other automo-
bile makers.  After more than a decade of quiet and effective repression during
which scattered attempts to organize the plants paid only defeat and personal
tragedy, the Depression years witnessed a renewed militancy among the
autoworkers.123  With this came increasingly frequent and effective use by
employers of repressive means to counter the assertion of labor rights.  We
have already mentioned the incident in 1932 in which Dearborn and Ford
police killed four protesters at the River Rouge plant, but there were other
expressions of labor militancy and violence around this time.  In the summer of
1930, a Communist union with a titular presence in many of the plants led a
strike at GM subsidiary, Fisher Body, in Flint, Michigan—in one of the plants
that would host the great sit-down strike a few years later.  After a few days,
the strike was smashed by police who broke up pickets and arrested dozens of
strikers.  The company and its allies followed this up with a torrent of anti-
radical propaganda.124
115 FINE, supra note 111, at 29-38, 98-99; ZIEGER, supra note 11, at 47-49; see also BERN-
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117 S. REP. No. 75-46, pt. 3, at 46-56 (1937) [hereinafter INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE].
118 Id. at 23, 92-93.
119 Id. at 92-93.
120 Id. at 8, 18.
121 Id. at 50.
122 Id. at 47.
123 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 92, 94-97, 502-09.
124 FINE, supra note 111, at 65-66; Fisher Body Co., WALL ST. J., July 8, 1930, at 13;
Fisher Body Strikers Clash with Troopers, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1930, at 2; Flint Strikers
Shun Reds, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1930, at 17.
580 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:561
Although battles such as these failed to break the open shop, they reflected
its increasing vulnerability, which the enactment of section 7(a) seemed only to
enhance.125  In 1933, there was a major strike at Ford suppliers, Briggs Manu-
facturing and Murray.126  And, in 1934, a strike that began at a Fisher Body
plant in Cleveland quickly spread to several other GM factories, although not
much came of it.127  Later that same year, a strike at a major parts producer in
Toledo, Toledo Auto-Lite, led to a pitched battle between nearly one thousand
picketers and supporters and more than one thousand National Guardsmen.  In
the clash, two protesters were shot dead and at least a score on both sides were
injured.128
Despite their stridence, these campaigns still made few lasting inroads on
the open shop, particularly at the Big Three.129  Not least among the reasons for
this was the unionists’ failure to field an effective program of industrial union
organizing that would actually mobilize the workers without also being ground
down by the machinery of repression.  In the latter regard, one problem was the
ability of employers and their allies to break pickets by force, a capacity made
painfully obvious in strikes of the early and mid-1930s just mentioned.
Another was the more insidious control the employers were able to assert over
workers within the plants.  An attempt by the Federal Union of Automobile
Workers to establish itself in GM’s Flint plants foundered in large part because
the company was able to place five spies on the union’s thirteen-member exec-
utive board.130  Its program laid open to management, the union’s membership
fell from 26,000 in 1934 to 120 in 1936.131  Later, union organizers in Flint
would report having to hold meetings in pitch-dark rooms, so great was the fear
of company spies and so desperate their efforts to circumvent them.132
Nevertheless, the passage of the Wagner Act and the emergence of the
CIO in late 1935 presaged a change in labor relations in the industry.  The CIO
was created with the immediate aim of launching a new and more determined
drive to organize the automobile industry.133  As it turned out, the AFL actually
created the United Automobile Workers (UAW) a few months before the CIO.
Ironically, though, the UAW only found its legs as an organizing force when it
fell into the orbit of the CIO.134  Although the CIO leadership would exercise
some control over this campaign, the impeding effort would be shaped to a
considerable degree by rank-and-file workers themselves as well as by the sig-
125 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 92, 94-97.
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nificant presence of Communists and other radicals.135  The organizers began
their work in early 1936.136
2. Industrial Terrorism Checked: The Sit-Down Strikes at General
Motors and Chrysler
Initially, UAW organizers appeared to make little headway in the factories.
To a considerable degree, this reflected a dilemma that faced the union’s
organizers.  The companies’ terroristic practices made it impossible for the
UAW to gain, let alone prove, majority support in the plants, even though the
union perceived (and later events proved) extensive latent support among the
workers.  As the NLRB’s investigations of the companies’ labor practices
would confirm, from the outset, organizers in and around the plants found
themselves relentlessly shadowed, often threatened, and sometimes beaten by
company police and spies.  In fact, it found that most workers were absolutely
terrified at the prospect of being seen with a known organizer, let alone found
in possession of union literature or paraphernalia.137  And discovery was a real
risk.  In its unceasing quest for espionage, GM went so far as to contract with
Pinkerton to establish an office in the same building as the UAW.138  In such a
context, strike success ironically emerged as an absolute prerequisite to
organizing success, as rank-and-file workers fearing for their jobs and safety
awaited such a strike as proof that the union—or the law—could actually pro-
tect them.139  But this only led back to the initial problem of finding a way to
mount a successful strike without the solid, unfettered support of a majority of
the company’s employees.
The sit-down strike answered this dilemma.  One obvious virtue of a suc-
cessful sit-down strike is that it denied the employer the ability, so provocative
and demoralizing to strikers, to continue production with replacement workers
and crossovers.  More fundamentally, such a strike could negate the capacity of
a powerful employer like GM to frustrate more straightforward attempts at
organizing.  In an industry like automobile manufacturing, a few workers strik-
ing at a critical point could shut down not only an entire factory, but potentially
a whole company.140  Importantly, the tactic also protected strikers against
assault, provocation, or arrest by police or company guards on a traditional
picket line.141  Beyond this, a sit-down forced the employer to take the initia-
tive and risk great damage to its plant if it tried to end the strike by force.142
Also in the tactic’s favor is that that the militancy inherent in the sit-down tactic
probably had a special appeal to automobile workers, a youngish workforce
whose ranks featured a spirit of insolence at its birth, and whose support for the
135 Id. at 373-74, 508-09.
136 Id. at 505.
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union was rooted as much in resentment of the capricious authority that per-
vaded the industry’s factories as in the material privations of Depression-era
industrial labor.143  If properly managed, a sit-down strike would convert a vis-
ceral desire on the part of many workers to wreak a humiliating vengeance on
the company into a productive organizing strategy.
A sit-down strike was not without risk, however.  Workers and their allies
would muster creative and not-implausible arguments that the tactic was con-
sistent with a limited property right to their jobs or a kind of lien against the
employer’s unfulfilled obligations under the labor law.144  Similarly, the NLRB
along with some courts would embrace the view that, in view of the employer’s
own violations of the law, equitable principles at least mitigated the act.145
Nevertheless, the dominant view was, and would remain, that the strikes vio-
lated basic principles of private property and subjected the strikers to forceful
eviction and prosecution under color of law.146  Furthermore, an ironic effect of
the tactic’s tendency to negate an employer’s ability to break the strike by force
is that if the employer was dissuaded or prevented from responding forcefully,
it could seem to some observers that the union was not justified in using the
tactic in the first place.  And however difficult it was for the unionists to imag-
ine at the time, there was also the risk that GM could eventually cast itself as a
victim in the contest.
Although the history of sit-down strikes traces back into the nineteenth
century, there had been only a few sit-down strikes in any industries through
the First New Deal period.147  In 1936 alone, however, there were forty-eight
sit-down strikes of at least one day’s duration.148  Between 1936 and 1939,
there would be almost six hundred major sit-down strikes, most conducted by
CIO unionists.149  In most cases, these strikes were used by workers to press
organizational aims in the face of employers’ use of illegal means to resist
union recognition and, of course, maintain production.150  This pattern became
particularly pronounced in late 1936, just as the big automobile sit-downs were
about to erupt.151
By the latter part of 1936, brief and spontaneous sit-downs were beginning
to occur in GM and Ford plants.152  Sensing momentum, UAW organizers
intensified their efforts—they “harass[ed] supervisors,” orchestrated numerous
brief “quickie” sit-downs, and increased membership “tenfold,” with organizers
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in Flint signing up some three thousand new members in December alone.153
Although it was essentially a company town dominated by GM economically
and politically, Flint was the central battleground in the effort to organize GM
and the focal point of the sit-down campaign.154  In fact, the union had consid-
erable success organizing GM workers in Flint, in part a product of the particu-
larly authoritarian disciplinary tactics that prevailed there.155  Flint was a good
place to mount a sit-down campaign for another reason, too—its plants consti-
tuted the closest thing to a central hub in GM’s production system and, if shut
down, promised to cripple the company’s operations.156  Such considerations
aside, the immediate impetus of the strike in Flint was something quite a bit
more mundane—a rumor that the company was about to preempt the strike by
removing critical machinery to another facility.157
The strike began on December 30, 1936, when, consistent with the union’s
overall plans but in a spontaneous way, workers seized Fisher Body Plants Nos.
1 and 2.158  The seizure was orderly.  Strikers immediately ushered out foremen
and managers and set about securing the sprawling facilities against attack and
otherwise preparing for an occupation that would last an extraordinary forty-
four days.159  During this time, the strikers successfully repelled a major assault
by the police—an ignominious rout that unionists tauntingly dubbed the “Battle
of the Running Bulls.”160  The strikers also defied two court injunctions order-
ing them to evacuate the plants, in part by bringing to light the issuing judges’
ownership of GM stock.161  Indeed, several weeks into the standoff, the strikers
actually enhanced their position by occupying another of GM’s plants in Flint,
one that produced vital engine components.162  Through this all, the occupa-
tions were otherwise disciplined and well organized.163  Most importantly, as
the union had hoped, the shortages created by the strike bottlenecked produc-
tion and crippled GM’s operations nationwide.  Indeed, the strike spread to
around a dozen other GM facilities, eventually idling about 150,000 production
workers.164
As the strike wore on, GM gradually ran out of options.  After the defeat
of the local police, the company was unable either to cajole or threaten Michi-
gan’s liberal governor, Frank Murphy, into using the National Guard to oust the
strikers; it was also unable to convince President Roosevelt to back down the
CIO leadership.  In the meantime, the strike succeeded in negating GM’s erst-
while capacity for labor repression: its hundreds of police and spies were ren-
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dered useless, and its capacity for propaganda was, for the time at least,
trumped by the workers’ sensational gambit.  In fact, by succeeding with such
an audacious strategy, the strikers electrified other GM workers with the possi-
bility of overcoming the company’s categorical opposition to labor rights.165
GM was losing the strike and it was also losing its aura of absolute power.  And
then there were business considerations.  The strike prevented the company
from producing an estimated 280,000 cars, valued at $270 million.166  Against
all the odds, the company was forced into a preliminary agreement that pro-
vided for the company’s eventual recognition of the UAW as the exclusive
agent of the company’s production workers.167
The political significance of the strike extended beyond GM.  Needless to
say, the strike had been thrilling, front-page news nationwide.168  Aside from
the remarkable spectacle of impoverished workers defiantly holding the prop-
erty of the world’s largest company, the UAW victory was by far the single
most significant victory over an open shop employer in American history.  Few
would have expected the UAW ever to prevail, given GM’s vast resources and
the strength of its opposition to unionism.  Workers of all kinds drew inspira-
tion from the strikers’ victory.169  Autoworkers, in particular, responded with a
new confidence in industrial unions and in the sit-down strike as a means of
achieving this.170  In the weeks immediately following the end of the Flint
strike, the UAW pulled at least eighteen sit-down strikes at other GM facilities
before the company and the union finally agreed to a company-wide contract in
mid-March 1937.171
Also in March, about six thousand UAW members occupied the nine
plants that Chrysler maintained in the Detroit area and held them for seventeen
days, during which time they also defied an injunction ordering them to evacu-
ate.172  Unlike their counterparts at GM, the Chrysler sit-down strikers left the
plants prior to a final settlement, albeit with Governor Murphy’s guarantee that
he would prevent the company from using strikebreakers to resume production
during the course of continuing negotiations.173  In April, the company settled
with the union, agreeing to the union’s partial (members-only) representation of
the company’s employees.174  As a result of the UAW’s success at GM,
Chrysler, and a number of smaller manufacturers, overall dues-paying member-
ship in the UAW increased meteorically, from 88,000 in February 1937 to more
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than 350,000 in October of the same year.175  By that time, of the major auto-
mobile manufacturers, only Ford remained unorganized.176  Against the back-
drop of years of bitter failure in the face of vicious opposition, the union’s
success in these few months was nothing short of phenomenal.
The strikes continued to reverberate well beyond the automobile industry.
“Within days of the settlement of the General Motors strike . . . the sit down
technique literally spread from coast to coast.”177  After only a handful of sit-
downs in 1936, in 1937 there were 477 of at least one-day’s duration, a figure
that represented one in ten major strikes that year.178  Sit-down strikes that year
involved more than one hundred thousand active participants and affected at
least three hundred thousand other workers.179  Although concentrated at man-
ufacturing firms, the strikes occurred in almost every conceivable line of work.
Mostly launched against intransigent employers by CIO unions, the strikes
were successful most of the time and were critical to the CIO’s growing suc-
cess in challenging the open shop.180
3. The Struggle Against Ford and Its “Servicemen”
In the late spring of 1937, with its victories over GM and Chrysler in hand,
the UAW began in earnest to attempt to organize Ford.181  Aware of the com-
pany’s capacity for labor repression and Henry Ford’s maniacal commitment to
a vision of authoritarian paternalism centered on the open shop, the union had
reason to believe that Ford would prove the most difficult of the Big Three to
organize.182  On the other hand, Ford’s workers were generally not as well paid
as GM’s and Chrysler’s and were anxious to remedy this inequity.183  Moreo-
ver, the company’s unrivaled tyranny over its workers led even conservative
workers to see union representation as the route to freedom on the shop
floors.184
Organizers and workers would have to reckon with Ford’s service depart-
ment, however, which “at its height consisted of 3,500 thugs, including former
boxers, ex-cops, bouncers, football players and ex-FBI agents, many of whom
were associated with the underworld.”185  The service department performed
all manner of functions in Ford’s plants, including espionage, police work, dis-
seminating propaganda, and, of course, administering threats and beatings.186
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While preventing unionization was obviously a major concern, the “service-
men” also participated in a more mundane type of control—violently enforcing
arbitrary company rules on dress and manners and habitually roughing up
workers who for any reason were summoned to meet with management person-
nel.187  The tyranny they enforced included a rule that denied even injured
workers the right to sit down in the presence of management personnel.188
Even more than most industrial employers, Ford’s commitment to the open
shop was premised on the belief that CIO unionism was like a contagion from
which workers could be protected—in their own interests, as the right to work
ideology suggested.189
Events at the company’s Dallas assembly plant highlighted the messy and
brutal way by which Ford’s scheme worked.  There, the service department
organized a large percentage of the company’s workers into “inside squads”
and “outside squads”—and actually taxed the employees to pay the expenses
incurred by these groups.190  The NLRB described the squads’ functions in
these terms: “For the most part methods of dealing with union organizers or
members or sympathizers or with persons suspected of being in any of these
classes were marked by extreme violence, merciless brutality, and banishment
from Dallas by threats of immediate bodily harm.”191  The Board found that in
and about that plant, the squads committed a great number of beatings of
organizers and employees suspected of union membership.192  In fact, in obvi-
ous contradiction of the company’s own pestilential concept of labor organiz-
ing, the campaign to keep the union out reduced to a practice of requiring all
employees to demonstrate their innocence of union involvement to escape beat-
ings.  Under the leadership of the professional servicemen, the squads roamed
around, tracking down UAW suspects and beating them; on occasion even ran-
dom people with no connection to the organizing campaign were caught and
beaten by the squads.193  One local man, although unconnected to the plant or
the union, expressed his support for the CIO to a squad member and became
the target of the outside squad.  The squad threatened him and mistakenly beat
his twin brother, who later died under suspicious circumstances.194  The Dallas
squads went so far as to establish three “whipping grounds” where suspected
unionists were regularly taken and beaten with fists and switches.  At one point,
both squads joined in a riotous attack on a family gathering of unionists who
had assembled to watch a labor film in a public park.  The squads stole material
and equipment and kidnapped, beat, and tarred and feathered the projectionist
(after deeming the speaker too old and frail for this treatment).  This brazen act
was too much for the governor, who sent in Texas Rangers, which managed to
deter only the most egregious acts of public violence.195
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As revealing as the Dallas case is, it pales in comparison to what occurred
in and around Ford’s huge River Rouge plant, the center of its operations.196
On May 26, 1937, Ford servicemen brutally attacked a group of fifty to seventy
UAW organizers, most of them women, who were attempting to distribute
handbills on public property adjacent to the plant’s major gates.197  The
organizers were led by future UAW president Walter Reuther and UAW board
member Richard Frankensteen and were accompanied by civic leaders, church-
men, and news reporters.  The presence of such people did not deter the ser-
vicemen from administering what the Board called “terrific beatings” to
Reuther and Frankensteen.198  Indeed, the servicemen did not spare the women,
churchmen, and reporters, all of whom were subjected to “savage” assaults and
had their property seized during the affray.199  The Dearborn police stood by
and watched the attacks.200
These cruel acts not only directly deterred organizing efforts, but also they
announced to everyone the totalitarian control that Ford exercised within and
about its plants.  For several years, these dynamics prevented any rigorous
organizing at Ford.201  In 1940, with a number of victories over Ford in NLRB
cases and with the manufacturing economy improving, the union renewed its
efforts.  Organizing was still risky, but the tide was turning on Ford.  Not least,
Ford’s over-the-top anti-unionism was increasingly anachronistic and hypocrit-
ical in a manufacturing economy increasingly awash in government defense
contracts.  Ford faced the real possibility of being denied such contracts if it
remained in violation of federal law.202  By 1941, the UAW had enlisted signif-
icant support at Ford’s plants, including the massive River Rouge complex.203
When, on April 1 of that year, the company summarily discharged a group of
known union members, the union was strong enough to endorse a strike that
shut the River Rouge plant.204
The struggle at River Rouge was critical.  There, the union outmaneuvered
the service department by placing its picket lines at a distance from the main
gates where Ford’s men had planned to meet and rout them.205  After huge
street battles with mostly black strikebreakers threatened to reduce the strike to
a politically disastrous race riot, the UAW mustered its black members and
supporters who brought the black community in the Detroit area behind the
strike and brought many of the strikebreakers and scabs over to the union’s
side.206  The union’s mass pickets around the plant kept it shut down.207
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Within days, Ford folded, agreeing to Board-supervised elections that the UAW
was certain to win.208  Within months, the UAW had secured an agreement
with Ford that was more favorable than its contracts with GM and Chrysler.209
With its contract with Ford secured, the UAW’s victory over the automo-
bile manufacturers seemed complete.  In some senses, it was.  However, the
union and the labor movement more generally would soon have to pay a steep
price for what workers and their allies had done, and had inspired many others
to do, to overcome the employers’ opposition to labor rights.
C. Industrial Terrorism Fully Realized: The Little Steel Strike of 1937
The Little Steel Strike is one of most tragic episodes in American labor
history.  In the course of the strike, which raged during the summer of 1937,
somewhere between sixteen and eighteen unionists were killed by public
police, steel company police, National Guardsmen, and loyal employees; they
died in a series of clashes at mills mainly scattered around the southern shores
of Lake Michigan (the Calumet Region), in northeast Ohio, and in western
Pennsylvania.  Hundreds more, most of them strikers and strike supporters,
were injured, thousands of people were arrested, and millions of dollars of
damage to property occurred.  Before the summer was over, the strike was
decisively broken.
The Little Steel Strike’s status as a signature event in American history
follows not merely because of the bloodshed and destruction wrought, but also
because of how the strike helped reshape labor law and policy.  As in automo-
bile manufacturing and other open shop industries, the steel workers eventually
gained recognition and signed contracts.  But, in steel especially, this success
could not be attributed much to organizing success, let alone the broken strike.
Rather, it had more to do with the steel companies’ acquiescence to the political
realities of an increasingly organized and militarized economy.  Nevertheless,
as the following discussion also shows, in spite of all of this, the violence the
steel companies visited on the workers would also form the basis of a reaction-
ary counterattack on labor rights.
1. The Open Shop and the Origins of the Little Steel Strike
When the Wagner Act was signed into law, the steel industry already had
a well-established reputation for violent conflicts over basic labor rights.  The
infamous 1892 struggle between unionists and Pinkertons at Homestead, Penn-
sylvania, which killed at least a half-dozen people, grew out of an attempt by
Carnegie Steel to purge itself of union representation.210  Before the Home-
stead dispute, about half of steel workers were organized, most of them by an
AFL craft union.211  Within ten years, the industry had achieved an open shop,
largely by means of a concerted campaign of repression that featured the usual
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techniques: blacklists, espionage, and threats and violence, as well as various
schemes for ensuring the companies’ domination of civil authority in the com-
munities surrounding their mills.212  Only a few strikes occurred in steel in the
early part of the 1900s and they were all quickly defeated.213  And there were
virtually no organizing efforts.
The pattern of steady decay and defeat continued through the 1910s and
into the 1920s.214  The major exception to this was the Great Steel Strike of
1919, which shocked the steel industrialists with its size and vigor before
foundering in the face of craft parochialism, ethnic tensions, and other axes of
chauvinism; economic exhaustion; and relentless and violent repression.215
During the 1920s in particular, the companies added to their bulwarks against
unions a smattering of paternalistic practices, including employee representa-
tion plans and very modest employee welfare programs.216  In this context,
union representation was confined to a few small, isolated, and thoroughly
insignificant craft enclaves.  Without meaningful representation, steel workers,
like most wage workers, suffered through very difficult time in that decade.217
The “basic steel” industry of the 1930s was characterized by the
supremacy of a few large firms.  By far the dominant among them was U.S.
Steel—“Big Steel”—even though it had lost market share to independent pro-
ducers since it emerged in 1901 as the largest business concern in history.218
These “little” independents consisted of a handful of large operators with many
thousands of employees and extensive vertically integrated operations.219  Such
were the Little Steel companies: Bethlehem, Republic, Youngstown Sheet &
Tube, Inland, American Rolling Mill Company (ARMCO), and National
(including its largest constituent, Weirton).  Although the Depression caused a
definite contraction in steel production and employment, by the mid 1930s, the
market for steel had improved and the companies were again earning profits
and expanding operations.220  By that time, the steel industry employed more
workers than any other manufacturing industry.221  The Little Steel companies
212 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 39-41; BRODY, supra note 211, at 50-51.
213 See LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 38-43; BRODY, supra note 211, at passim; see also
Robert Hessen, The Bethlehem Steel Strike of 1910, 15 LAB. HIST. 3 (1974).
214 Lesser exceptions to this include a 1910 strike at Bethlehem in South Bethlehem, Penn-
sylvania, and a strike against Sheet & Tube and Republic in Youngstown, which left several
people dead. See HORACE BANCROFT DAVIS, LABOR AND STEEL 238-40 (1933); 3 Killed, 19
Shot, Town Set Afire, Ohio Militia Out, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1916, at 1; 250 Arrested in
Riots, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1916, at 2; Troops Quell Riots in East Youngstown, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 9, 1916, at 7.
215 On the higher estimate of participants and the estimate of 20 killed, see FOSTER, supra
note 27, at 100-01, 223.  On the lower estimate of participants, see BRODY, supra note 25, at
113.
216 DAVIS, supra note 214, at 145-48.
217 See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at passim; ZIEGER, supra note 34, at 9.
218 Thomas K. McCraw & Forest Reinhardt, Losing to Win: U.S. Steel’s Pricing, Investment
Decisions, and Market Share, 1901-1938, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 593, 593 (1989).
219 For a history of the Little Steel Companies, see 2 WILLIAM T. HOGAN, ECONOMIC HIS-
TORY OF THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES passim (1971).
220 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 17; 3 HOGAN, supra note 219, at 1119.
221 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.:
1940, at 826 tbl.830 (1941).
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accounted for about 186,000 workers: 80,000 at Bethlehem; 46,000 at Repub-
lic; 23,000 at Sheet & Tube; and 14,000 at Inland.222  The two other Little Steel
firms, which would not be involved directly in the strike, ARMCO and
National, employed 12,000 and 11,000, respectively.223  Although never for-
mally constituted as a consortium or trade group, by the 1930s the companies
were entwined by extensive professional, personal, and economic ties, and by a
common opposition to union organizing efforts.224
The Great Depression wrecked havoc on steel workers, bringing mass
unemployment, wage cuts, and general insecurity.225  But here, too, the
Depression era would eventually see a dramatic escalation in union organizing.
Partly, this reflected the energizing effect of section 7(a).226 Another effect of
section 7(a) was to further encourage employers to form company unions in
steel with the result that more than 90 percent of workers were at least nomi-
nally covered by these organizations.227  Interestingly, these bogus unions
would actually exercise some independence and facilitate covert organizing by
genuine unionists.228  As in other industries, though, the push to organize the
steel industry ultimately originated in the working class itself.  At its inception,
the CIO viewed organizing steel as a priority on par with automobiles.229  In
the summer of 1936, it created the Steel Workers Organizing Committee
(SWOC) and sent more than two hundred SWOC organizers to the mills.230  Of
these, perhaps sixty were Communists.231  However, ultimate control of the
drive remained firmly with the CIO and its main sponsor, the United Mining
Workers (UMW), which also provided the majority of organizers and domi-
nated the SWOC’s leadership.232
The overall program of the SWOC organizers, whose number would even-
tually increase to more than four hundred,233 comprised three main strategies:
(1) to try to subvert the racial and ethnic conflicts among workers that had long
impeded the organization of steel workers, (2) to invoke the authority of the
federal government as well as whatever practical influence the newly created
222 3 HOGAN, supra note 219, at 1178-79.
223 Id.
224 Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor: Hearings on S. Res. 266 Before the
Subcomm. on Educ. & Labor, 75th Cong. exhibits 5200-06, at 13893-97 (1938) [ hereinafter
La Follette Committee Hearings]; LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 14-32, 57, 70-71; ZIEGER,
supra note 11, at 14-15.
225 3 HOGAN, supra note 219, at 1167; ZIEGER, supra note 11, at 13.  Between 1929 and
1933, total employment in steel production fell by more than 100,000. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: 1937, at 742
tbl.780 (1938).
226 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 455; ZIEGER, supra note 11, at 16-17.
227 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 455; 3 HOGAN, supra note 219, at 1167.
228 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 455-57; Max Gordon, The Communists and the Drive to
Organize Steel, 23 LAB. HIST. 254, 258 (1982).
229 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 434-35.
230 GALENSON, supra note 11, at 84, 86.
231 WILLIAM Z. FOSTER, HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES 349
(1952); Gordon, supra note 228, at 258.
232 GALENSON, supra note 11, at 110; ZIEGER, supra note 11, at 37; Gordon, supra note
228, at 254, 257-58.
233 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 452.
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NLRB might have, and (3) to infiltrate the company unions.234  The union’s
effort to execute this program met determined opposition at all the major steel
companies.  In fact, the entire industry made clear that it would vigorously
defend the open shop.235  From the outset, the companies hounded the
organizers, spied on them, tried to drive them from the mills, and generally
sought to intimidate the rank and file against supporting the SWOC.236  The
records of the La Follette Committee and the NLRB, along with other sources,
document the extraordinary frequency with which organizers were beaten,
threatened, and even kidnapped by company police and other operatives.237
Like UAW unionists, organizers were reduced to meeting in the dark, in some
instances at night in deserted fields.238
In a remarkable testament to the perseverance of the organizers and the
steel workers, by the fall of 1936, the SWOC controlled the company unions of
its main target, U.S. Steel.239  SWOC organizers also enrolled many members
into their own independent unions.  They claimed no more than 16,000 mem-
bers when the drive began, but grew to 86,000 members in November 1936,
and to 125,000 members by early the next year.240  In the first part of 1937, of
course, the GM sit-down strike was underway.  If the sit-down strike bolstered
the morale of the workers, for at least some steel executives, it was a portent of
what might be required to defend the open shop.241  The threat of a sit-down
strike appears to have been one of several factors that influenced U.S. Steel’s
chairman, Myron Taylor, to conclude that unions were an unavoidable reality
in the future of steel production and that continued resistance would only delay
234 Id. at 454-55; see also Negroes Urged to Join Steel Union Drive, STEEL LAB., Oct. 20,
1936, at 7; Prominent Negroes Push Steel Drive, STEEL LAB., Feb. 20, 1937, at 5; The Steel
Drive Gets Going, STEEL LAB., Aug. 1, 1936, at 2.
235 This position was clearly articulated in a series of articles and statements in the indus-
try’s trade journal. Royalist Lewis Adds Fabricators to His Prospective Empire, IRON AGE,
July 30, 1936, at 45, 45-46; L.W. Moffett, Washington, IRON AGE, July 9, 1936, at 72, 75-
76; Steel Companies Meet Unionization Drive with Statement of Position, IRON AGE, July, 9,
1936, at 88, 88; Steel Industry States Attitude Toward Unionization Drive Now Under Way,
IRON AGE, July 2, 1936, at 55, 55-56; see also 3 HOGAN, supra note 219, at 1172.
236 Early in the drive, the steel companies spent $114,000 on newspaper ads denouncing the
SWOC.  Donald Gene Sofchalk, The Little Steel Strike of 1937, at 9-10 (1961) (unpublished
Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State University), available at http://etd.ohiolink.edu/
view.cgi?acc_num=osu1283265534.
237 La Follette Committee Hearings, supra note 224, at 11043, 11051-57, 11072-73; LITTLE
STEEL, supra note 8, at 96-98; PRIVATE POLICE SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at 187-94.
238 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 229.
239 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 462-66; GALENSON, supra note 11, at 87. On the SWOC’s
remarkable bid to take control of the company unions at U.S. Steel and elsewhere, see 50
More Representatives Bolt to SWOC, STEEL LAB., Feb. 6, 1937, at 3; Company Union Rep-
resentatives Join Steel Union Movement, STEEL LAB., Aug. 1, 1936, at 6; Company Union
Representatives Press Hard for Wage Increase as S.W.O.C. Lends Inspiration and Authority
to the Movement, STEEL LAB., Sept. 25, 1936, at 1; Steel Union Men Win in Mill Election,
STEEL LAB., Apr. 10, 1937, at 3; S.W.O.C. Encourages Company Unions to Make Wage
Demands, STEEL LAB., Sept. 1, 1936, at 2; Two Men Win at Bethlehem Steel: Company
Union Picks SWOC Men to Meet Bosses, STEEL LAB., Jan. 23, 1937, at 5; U.S. Steel’s Ben
Fairless Suffers Another Set-back, STEEL LAB., Sept. 25, 1936, at 3.
240 GALENSON, supra note 11, at 86; Steel Union Passes 125,000; Start Plans for Conven-
tion, STEEL LAB., Jan. 9, 1937, at 1.
241 GALENSON, supra note 11, at 95.
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the inevitable.242  To the surprise of nearly everyone, in March 1937, the
SWOC and U.S. Steel signed a members-only collective bargaining
agreement.243
The SWOC’s next major target was Jones & Laughlin, a large independent
comparable in size to the Little Steel firms.244  From the outset of the organiz-
ing drive, Jones & Laughlin’s resistance was fierce; its spies and company
police relentlessly harassed, arrested, and assaulted SWOC organizers.245
However, the signing of the contract with U.S. Steel, combined with the factors
that led U.S. Steel to the same conclusion, as well as Jones & Laughlin’s some-
what tenuous financial condition, appears to have led the company’s manage-
ment to reconsider its absolute opposition to unionization and propose terms to
SWOC.246  Sensing the company’s vulnerability and its own momentum, on
May 12, 1937, the SWOC ignored the company’s offer and launched a massive
and violence-ridden strike at the company’s mills at Pittsburgh and Aliquippa,
Pennsylvania.247  The strike at Aliquippa was especially audacious, as the
SWOC confronted a formidable system of labor repression so woven into the
fabric of this company town that the place was called “Little Siberia” in labor
circles.248  Workers described frequent savage beatings both inside the mill and
in town, along with unremitting surveillance, malicious arrests, and summary
punishment by company police.249  Undaunted, the unionists turned the tables
on the company.  They besieged the gates of the Aliquippa plant with a massive
cordon, attacking crossovers and fighting the police, and forcing the plant to
close for about two days.250  Unlike the other major producers, Jones & Laugh-
lin had remained unprofitable since the beginning of the Depression.251  Fear-
ing the strike might destroy its viability, the company agreed to grant the
SWOC exclusive representation if it prevailed in an NLRB-sponsored election.
Only a week later, the union achieved just that.252
242 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 467-70; FINE, supra note 111, at 329-30; ZIEGER, supra
note 11, at 58-59.
243 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 472-73; GALENSON, supra note 11, at 93; 3 HOGAN, supra
note 219, at 1173-77; U.S. Steel Corporation Signs Union Contract, STEEL LAB., Mar. 6,
1937, at 1.
244 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 453; GALENSON, supra note 11, at 99.
245 In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 503, 510 (1936); BERNSTEIN, supra note
10, at 475-77.
246 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 474, 476-77.
247 25,000 J & L Men Strike for Signed Contract, STEEL LAB., May 15, 1937, at 1.
248 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 474-75; see also ZIEGER, supra note 11, at 60.
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S. 1392, S. 1550, S. 1580, S. 2123 Before the S. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 76th Cong.
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GOES,. . .UNIONISM: IN A BASIC INDUSTRY 123-27 (1940); ZIEGER, supra note 11, at 60-61;
see also C.I.O. Spreads Steel Strike; Seeks to Stir 200,000 Men to Join Walkout, CHI. DAILY
TRIB., May 14, 1937, at 1; C.I.O. Steel Strike Shuts Two Plants of Jones-Laughlin: 27,000
Men Are Idle, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1937, at 1; Louis Stark, Peace Plan Drawn in Big Steel
Strike; More Plants Close, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1937, at 1.
251 3 HOGAN, supra note 219, at 1254-55.
252 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 478; ZIEGER, supra note 11, at 60-61; SWOC Wins by
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The SWOC’s victory over Big Steel and Jones & Laughlin encouraged
many of the smaller steel fabricating companies targeted by the drive to grant
the SWOC representation or agree to elections.253  But a showdown loomed at
the Little Steel companies, which stood fast in their opposition to the union.
Despite the companies’ resistance, the SWOC had managed to organize a siza-
ble number of workers at Inland and Sheet & Tube; lesser, but still significant,
numbers at Republic; and possibly only a “small fraction” at Bethlehem.254
The union had made little progress at National and ARMCO, however, where
beatings by “special watchmen,” orchestrated vigilantism, aggressive company
unions, and other measures successfully foiled organizing efforts.255  These
companies would not be part of the coming strike.
2. Little Steel’s Machinery of Industrial Terrorism
A grim indication of what awaited the SWOC at the Little Steel firms took
place two years before the 1937 strike, when Republic Steel crushed a strike at
one of its smaller subsidiaries, Berger Manufacturing in Canton, Ohio.  The
union, an AFL affiliate, launched the strike on May 27, 1935, after fruitless
requests for recognition.256  Well in advance of the strike, Republic augmented
Berger’s arsenal of firearms and armored cars by purchasing thousands of dol-
lars worth of “gas munitions”; it also sent dozens of men to Canton to reinforce
Berger’s police force and to work as strikebreakers.257  Soon after the union set
up pickets, company police launched a “planned attack” on hundreds of strikers
and sympathizers.258  Over a dozen union people were hurt, some shot, in the
ensuing riot.259  A few days later, forty company police drove through workers’
neighborhoods, gassing, beating, and shooting at everyone they encountered.
As the La Follette Committee put it, “Innocent bystanders, school children, and
women who happened to be in the path of the private police were mercilessly
beaten and shot.”260  Again, over a dozen people were seriously injured and
hospitalized and one man probably killed.261  This and other “raids” to follow
253 3 HOGAN, supra note 219, at 1178.  On the SWOC’s success reaching contracts, see The
Union Mills, STEEL LAB., June 5, 1937, at 2; The Union Mills, STEEL LAB., May 15, 1937, at
2; Wheeling Steel, Timken Roller, 86 Others Sign, STEEL LAB., May 1, 1937, at 1.
254 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 479-80.
255 On practices at these companies, see In re Weirton Steel Co., 32 N.L.R.B. 1145, 1163-
65 (1941) (a National Steel subsidiary); Benjamin Stolberg, Big Steel, Little Steel, and
C.I.O., NATION, July 31, 1937, at 119, available at http//newdeal.feri.org/nation/
na37145p119.htm.
256 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 88.  The union’s efforts included an effort to litigate the
matter before the labor board created to enforce § 7(a). Its case before the labor board was
first enjoined by a lower court and then mooted entirely when, just days before the strike, the
Supreme Court declared the NIRA unconstitutional. Id.
257 Id. at 88-89; PRIVATE POLICE SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at 127-28.
258 PRIVATE POLICE SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at 133.
259 Id. at 129-30.
260 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 89.
261 La Follette Committee Hearings, supra note 224, at 10040-43, exhibits 4349, 4350, at
10186-87; LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 90; PRIVATE POLICE SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at
130, 136-44.
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“plunged [Canton] into a state of terror and disorder” that lasted until the strike
was broken.262
The violence of the Berger strikers was the culmination of a potent system
of labor repression that also featured espionage, the use of professional strike-
breaking services, the mobilization of “citizens groups,” and the use of propa-
ganda.263  As the La Follette Committee found, the same things lay in store for
the SWOC.  The committee’s investigations at Republic and Sheet & Tube in
particular, revealed aggressive efforts, beginning at the outset of the SWOC’s
organizing drive and escalating as the strike approached, to penetrate the union
with spies and then to use these men as well as company police and hired
strikebreakers in a coordinated campaign to assault and otherwise harass
SWOC organizers.264  At these companies, and to a lesser extent at Bethlehem,
the committee also uncovered ramped up reliance on company unions and pub-
licity and propaganda services, as well as efforts to cultivate opposition to the
union among churches and community groups.265  The companies expended
considerable effort trying to either maintain their company unions or build up
new ones to replace those infiltrated by the SWOC.266
In early 1936, Republic maintained a permanent police force of about 270
men spread among its plants; in response to the SWOC’s organizing, the com-
pany expanded this force to about 350 in early 1937 and nearly 400 by the time
the strike wound down in August.267  But, like the number of GM’s on-staff
spies, these figures tell only part of the story.  Like other industrial employers,
during past strikes, including the one at Berger, Republic had augmented its
armed forces by hiring men or contracting with strikebreaking firms.268  As
was also the case in earlier strikes, Republic and the other steel companies
could reasonably expect the support of local public police and possibly Guards-
men, particularly if the strike became violent.269  By these means, during the
strike in Ohio alone, Republic and Sheet & Tube would field 2,400 armed men
under its direct control.270  Across the strike zone, they would be backed by
7,000 “guards, patrolmen, deputy sheriffs, National Guardsmen, city police,
and company police.”271
The forces organized by the companies did not want for weapons.  Sheet
& Tube’s arsenal included 1,020 firearms (369 rifles, 453 handguns, and 190
shotguns), more than 76,000 rounds of firearm ammunition, and 109 gas guns
262 INDUSTRIAL MUNITIONS, supra note 8, at 111-12.
263 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 88-91. See generally PRIVATE POLICE SYSTEMS, supra
note 8, at 126-52.
264 See LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 93-99.
265 Id. at 89-90, 109-15, 130-31.
266 In re Republic Steel Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 219, 221 (1937); In re Inland Steel Co., 10
N.L.R.B. 783, 804-06 (1938); see also Republic Employees Organize New Union, YOUNGS-
TOWN VINDICATOR, May 20, 1937, at 1.
267 PRIVATE POLICE SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at 116, 186.
268 Id. at 186
269 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 128-29, 171-76.
270 La Follette Committee Hearings, supra note 224, at 11499. Bethlehem also substantially
increased its police force during the lead up to the strike.  Sofchalk, supra note 236, at 33.
271 La Follette Committee Hearings, supra note 224, at 11497.
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of all types, for which it possessed more than 3,000 rounds of ammunition.272
Republic’s stock was equally impressive: 861 firearms (64 rifles, 552 hand-
guns, and 245 shotguns), more than 77,000 rounds of ammunition, and 204 gas
guns of all types, for which it had more than 6,000 rounds of ammunition.273
Sheet & Tube also had eight military-style machine guns.274  In fact, many of
the firearms stocked at both companies (beside the machine guns) were military
in character, and much of the gas was potent to the point of being potentially
lethal.275  In addition to all of this, the companies also maintained extensive
stores of blunt-force weapons, flares, bandoliers, and other military- and police-
type accessories.276  Although Republic and Sheet & Tube were the focus of
the investigation and probably had the largest arsenals, the committee uncov-
ered considerable evidence of similar “munitioning” at all the basic steel com-
panies.277  For that matter, the committee’s investigations revealed that the
accumulation of such weapons was widespread in the open shop industries.278
The committee found that time and again, when threatened by a strike, the
steel companies augmented and restocked their weapons inventories.279  The
lead-up to the Little Steel Strike was no different—Republic spent $50,000 on
armaments (mainly gas) in the month before the strike.280  When considered
along with the size and nature of the stockpiles, and the way the armaments
were marketed, purchased, and stored, this tendency for purchases to precede
strikes undermined the companies’ claims that the weapons served mundane or
otherwise defensive purposes.281  It should be mentioned in this connection that
the companies made no effort to conceal the existence of these stockpiles from
the strikers—indeed, they flaunted the fact.282
The La Follette Committee also uncovered evidence confirming that the
Little Steel companies used their stockpiles to arm public police forces that
allied with them.283  In fact, it seems in some cases gifts of weapons were used
to cultivate alliances with the police.284  The committee also gathered extensive
evidence that the companies used their influence in the mill communities to
272 INDUSTRIAL MUNITIONS, supra note 8, at 43, 45, app. E, at 219.
273 Id. at 41, app. C, at 217, app. D, at 218.
274 Id. at 45.
275 Id. at 19-28 (citing multiple incidents of injury and one incident where one patient who
inhaled the gas sank into a comma and died in the hospital after the fourth day).
276 Id. at 19, app. F, at 221.
277 Id. at passim.
278 Id. 61-65 (noting gas munition stockpiling by numerous companies).
279 Id. at 59 (“companies purchased munitions only immediately before or during strikes”).
280 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 125-28.
281 INDUSTRIAL MUNITIONS, supra note 8, at 69-105.
282 See Always Had Guns on Hand, Girdler Says, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 2, 1937,
at 1; NLRB Will Investigate Steel Workers’ Charge of Shooting, ‘Arsenals,’ WASH. POST,
June 19, 1937, at 1; Shoot-to-Kill Order Laid to Republic Boss, STEEL LAB., June 5, 1937, at
5.  The SWOC instituted court proceedings aimed at having the companies’ weapons seized.
Asks Republic Show Records: Court Orders Firm to Give Data on Guns, Arms, YOUNGS-
TOWN VINDICATOR, June 16, 1937, at 1.
283 INDUSTRIAL MUNITIONS, supra note 8, at 131.
284 Id. at 131 (noting that gifts of policing equipment, at the very least, “arouse suspicion”
that the weapons will be used by the public administration to carry out the donees’ private
ends).
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maintain revolving doors of employment between company police and local,
public police.285  Two-thirds of the nearly three hundred “special police” hired
during the strike by city and county authorities in and around Youngstown,
Ohio, were actually employees of Sheet & Tube or Republic.286  Likewise,
during the strike, local police often deputized company men and then made
little effort to actually exercise any control over their subsequent actions.287  By
such means, the steel companies built relationships with some local police
forces that were so intimate and cooperative that they verged on de facto com-
pany control.
3. Breaking the Little Steel Strike
In late March 1937, the SWOC asked the Little Steel companies to enter a
collective bargaining agreement similar to the one agreed by U.S. Steel.288
Although the companies subsequently met with the representatives of the
union, their purpose was only to affirm their adherence to the open shop.289
The companies cynically couched their position in a refusal to sign written
agreements, which they claimed the law did not require.290  This was a pretext
designed to conceal a categorical opposition to recognizing or bargaining with
the SWOC and frustrate NLRB proceedings against them.291  Under the leader-
ship of Republic’s president, Tom Girdler, a tough and thoroughly reactionary
character, the Little Steel companies were really angling to destroy the union
on the picket lines.292
It did not take long for the conflict to escalate.  In early May, Republic
effected mass discharges of union supporters followed by lockouts at its Can-
ton, Ohio, mills, and then on May 20 at its plants in Massillon, Ohio.293  The
285 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 128-29, 171-76.
286 La Follette Committee Hearings, supra note 224, exhibit 4777, at 12136-38.  It seems
that the SWOC was well aware of these efforts even before the strike began. See, e.g.,
SWOC Demands Deputy Records, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, May 21, 1937, at 1.
287 La Follette Committee Hearings, supra note 224, exhibits 4739, 4741, 4742(a)-(c), at
12066-69, 12070-78; STRIKEBREAKING SERVICES, supra note 16, at 110-11.
288 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 116.
289 Id. at 118-19; Terms Given by Republic Are Rejected, STEEL LAB., May 24, 1937, at 2.
290 GALENSON, supra note 11, at 98-100.  On the bad faith of these companies in the negoti-
ations preceding the strike, see In re Inland Steel Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 783, 795-97 (1938); In re
Republic Steel Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 219, 250-51, 323-34, 379-82 (1938); LITTLE STEEL, supra
note 8, at 117-131; Sofchalk, supra note 236, at 62-63, 70-72; see also Independent Steel
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SWOC Groups, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1937, at 1.
291 Sofchalk, supra note 236, at 62-63, 70-72.
292 In re Republic Steel, 9 N.L.R.B. at 249-50, 322-23; BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 480-81
(noting Girdler’s antiunion sentiment and philosophy that he would rather “shut down and
raise apples and potatoes” than deal with a union); Stolberg, supra note 255, at 119.
293 In re Republic Steel, 9 N.L.R.B. at 249-51  (citing Republic Steel’s shut down of mills at
the Massillon, Ohio plant); see also LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 229-30 (citing the same);
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Rejects Conference with Republic, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, May 6, 1937, at 1; Republic
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SWOC locals responded with a smattering of spontaneous or nearly spontane-
ous strikes,294 followed by the leadership’s announcement of a deadline for
recognition, and finally, on May 26—the same day Ford’s servicemen were
beating UAW activists in Dearborn—by an official strike call at all Republic
plants as well as those of Sheet & Tube and Inland.295  Pickets and mass walk-
outs quickly closed operations at all Sheet & Tube and Inland mills and most
Republic plants.296  Although the strike call did not initially extend to Bethle-
hem, a strike by railway workers at its Cambria Works in Johnstown, Penn-
sylvania, provoked a sympathy walkout on June 11 that effectively brought that
large plant into the strike.297  The strike affected scores of mills across the
Great Lakes region.  But it was centered in two places: the Calumet Region and
northeast Ohio, particularly in and around the cities of Cleveland, Youngstown,
Niles, Warren, and Canton.  It probably entailed a total of one hundred thou-
sand workers, including as many as twenty thousand miners, rubber workers,
and others who struck in sympathy.
The strike was soon awash in violence.  The most notorious and deadly
incident occurred only days into the strike—on Memorial Day, at Republic’s
plant in South Chicago.  Ten strikers and supporters were mortally wounded
and approximately one hundred injured when city police, some of whom were
billeted at the plant and armed by Republic, fired point-blank into a somewhat
rowdy but unthreatening crowd of protesters that had marched to one of the
plant’s gates to demand the right to establish a mass picket.298  The claim by
the police and Republic that the demonstrators had planned to rout the police
and capture the plant was thoroughly refuted, in part by the La Follette Com-
mittee’s discovery of a Paramount Pictures newsreel.299  The newsreel, which
Paramount had kept secret, and which captured much of the affray, including
savage assaults on wounded demonstrators, contradicted the claim that the
YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, May 12, 1937, at 1; “We’ll Close,” Local Plants Warn Steel
Union, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, May 18, 1937, at 1; Youngstown Steel Heads Unshaken
by SWOC Victory, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1937, at 1.
294 Local Lodges Delay Action, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, May 13, 1937, at 1; Strike at 5
Mills of Republic Steel, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1937, at 1.
295 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 483; 3 HOGAN, supra note 219, at 1179; see also
Power Voted for Strike Call, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, May 16, 1937, at 1; Republic, S-T
Next for SWOC, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, May 24, 1937, at 1; Steel Strike Seen Immi-
nent, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, May 23, 1937, at 1.
296 Strike Hits Steel Mills in 5 States, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, May 27, 1937, at 1; see
also 13,000 Idle in Canton Republic Strike, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, May 26, 1937, at 1;
Louis Stark, 27 Big Steel Mills Darkened by Strike, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1937, at 1; Steel
Labor Situation, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1937, at 3; Thousands Jobless in Steel Strikes,
YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, May 27, 1937, at 1.
297 3 HOGAN, supra note 219, at 1179 (referencing the Johnsontown strike); see also In re
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 14 N.L.R.B. 539, 612-13 (1939); Cambria Mill Hit by Railway
Strike, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1937, at 5; Cambria Mill of Bethlehem Goes on Strike, STEEL
LAB., June 21, 1937, at 1. Production at the Cambria plant was curtailed, but not stopped, by
the strike. Bethlehem Operating Johnstown Plant Despite Strike; Coal Walkout Ordered,
IRON AGE, June 17, 1937, at 91, 91.
298 INDUSTRIAL MUNITIONS, supra note 8, at 147; S. REP NO. 75-46, pt. 2, at 2 (1937)
[hereinafter MEMORIAL DAY INCIDENT] .
299 MEMORIAL DAY INCIDENT, supra note 298, at 2, 13, 16, 28, 31.
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demonstrators were the aggressors on the field that day—but not before this
view was endorsed by major media outlets.300
On June 10, in Monroe, Michigan, a black organizer was nearly lynched
by a mob of company loyalists as the police apparently stood by.301  Later that
same day the company, a Republic subsidiary, used a contingent of two hun-
dred “special police” sworn in by the city but armed by Republic to smash the
union’s picket line.302  The attack commenced with the police firing gas muni-
tions donated by Republic.303  The picketers were beaten and chased before a
crowd of perhaps several thousand spectators.304  Police and vigilantes then
arrested a number of the strikers, burned their picket-line installations, and
overturned their cars into a nearby river.305  For days afterward, hundreds of
special police roamed the city warding off would-be picketers before forces
sent by Governor Murphy restored limited picketing.306
In Youngstown, Ohio, where both Republic and Sheet & Tube maintained
large plants, the county sheriff’s office added 152 special police, of whom 94
were loyal Republic and Sheet & Tube employees, and the city police added
144, of whom 59 were steel company employees.307  On June 19, amid a com-
pany-directed “back-to-work” campaign, city police launched a largely unpro-
voked gas attack on a Republic picket line staffed by women, which the
company claimed was occupying company property adjacent to the street.308  A
riot ensued, followed by several hours of fighting in which strikers traded gun-
fire with public and company police under the occasional glare of parachute
flares.309  By early morning, two strikers had been shot dead (probably by com-
pany police) and approximately forty-two people, mainly strikers and sympa-
thizers, were wounded.310  Police later arrested dozens of strikers, many of
them picked up in pretextual raids on their homes.311
On the night of July 11, a force of Massillon, Ohio city police and special
police under the command of a company agent used firearms and gas to attack
a festive gathering of several hundred unarmed and peaceful picketers near the
300 Id. at 16, 28, 31; Chesly Manly, Senators View Film of Chicago Strike Rioting, CHI.
DAILY TRIB., July 3, 1937, at 2.  On media claims that the police were attacked, see, for
example, 4 Dead, 90 Hurt in Steel Riot, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 31, 1937, at 1; Chicagoans
Led in Steel Strike by Outsiders, CHI. TRIB., June 1, 1937, at 2.
301 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 142, 151-55.
302 Id. at 159.
303 INDUSTRIAL MUNITIONS, supra note 8, at 153.
304 F. Raymond Daniell, Conflict Is Brief, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1937, at 1.
305 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 160-61; INDUSTRIAL MUNITIONS, supra note 8, at 154;
see also Joseph M. Turrini, The Newton Steel Strike: A Watershed in the CIO’s Failure to
Organize “Little Steel,” 38 LAB. HIST. 229, 259 (1997).
306 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 161; F. Raymond Daniell, Monroe Picketing Restored by
Pact, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1937, at 7; F. Raymond Daniell, To Isolate Crowd, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13, 1937, at 1; Vigilantes Guard Lone Road to Mill, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1937, at 3.
307 GALENSON, supra note 11, at 103.
308 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 188-89.
309 Id. at 190-91; Sofchalk, supra note 236, at 320-22.
310 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 190-91; Sofchalk, supra note 236, at 322; see also
Pitched Battle in Youngstown Follows Gassing of C.I.O. Women, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
1937, at 1.
311 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 196-97.
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union’s headquarters.312  Two, possibly three, strikers were killed and an
“undetermined” number of people were injured in the attack and the melee that
followed.313  Police later ransacked the union headquarters and nearby homes
and, without warrants, arrested every unionist they could find in the area (about
165) and held them “for several days, for the crime, apparently, of belonging to
the Union.”314  The NLRB later found that the police involved in this affair lied
when they claimed the violence was provoked by serious threats from the
union, and that the police actually had either seized on a very minor provoca-
tion or simply initiated the clash.315  The Board found that the whole episode
was the culmination of a concerted effort by Republic’s management to visit
violence on the strikers under the cover of public authority.316
By the time the strike ground to an end in July, at least two (and likely
three) more people had also been killed.  A disabled union man selling tickets
to a union dance was killed on June 29 in Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania, when he
was struck in the head by a Guardsman’s tear gas projectile as the authorities
forced picketers away from a Republic plant.317  On June 30, a striker died
apparently after being clubbed by a Guardsman in Canton—authorities said the
man in his late thirties had a heart attack.318  And in late July, a striker was
fatally run over by a strikebreaker’s car speeding through the picket line at a
Republic mill in Cleveland, hours before picketers there were routed by a ram-
paging army of loyal employees wielding pipes and clubs.319 In all, the La
Follette Committee, documented 323 strike-related injuries, including 40 gun-
shot wounds (of which all but 3 were inflicted on strikers and strike sympathiz-
ers) as well as 10 permanently disabling injuries.320  Almost certainly, this was
an underestimation.
312 In re Republic Steel Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 219, 273, 280 (1938).
313 Id. at 273; LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 237.
314 In re Republic Steel, 9 N.L.R.B. at 317; see also LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 250-52;
2 Die, 15 Hurt at Reopening of Republic Plant, WASH. POST, July 13, 1937, at 3.
315 In re Republic Steel, 9 N.L.R.B. at 307-08.
316 Id. at 267, 318.
317 La Follette Committee Hearings, supra note 224, exhibit 5250, at 13968-69.  At least
sixteen were killed in the strike; the number rises to eighteen if the death at Canton is added
and if a third death, possibly caused by the delayed effects of tear gas exposure, is counted at
Massillon. In re Republic Steel, 9 N.L.R.B. at 273; see also Convention Honors Martyrs of
Union, STEEL LAB., Dec. 31, 1937, at 3; Republic Gave Guns to Massillon Cops, STEEL
LAB., Aug. 6, 1937, at 5; Stone 8 Despite Troops at Steel Mills in Canton, CHI. DAILY TRIB.,
July 1, 1937, at 13; Troops Mobilized as 2 Mills Prepare to Reopen in Indiana, WASH. POST,
July 1, 1937, at 1.
318 8 Hurt, 75 Seized in Riot at Canton, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1937, at 3; Reporters See
Guardsmen Beat Strikers, STEEL LAB., July 7, 1937, at 3; Troops Mobilized as 2 Mills Pre-
pare to Reopen in Indiana, supra note 317; Trouble Flares Again at Canton, CLEVELAND
PLAIN DEALER, July 1, 1937, at 1.
319 40 Hurt in New Strike Riot, CHI. DAILY TRIB., July 27, 1937, at 1; 60 Hurt in Night Steel
Strike Clash, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, July 27, 1937, at 1; Cleveland Police Bar Steel
Pickets, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1937, at 9; Night Clashes Follow Killing in Steel Strike,
WASH. POST, July 27, 1937, at 1; Rain Routs C.I.O. Throng at Square, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, July 30, 1937, at 1; John M. Storm, Steel Union Fight Turns to Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 1937, at 58.
320 La Follette Committee Hearings, supra note 224, exhibit 5250, at 13968.
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Hundreds of strikers were arrested during the strike, often while picketing
plant gates and often in large numbers.321  For example, during the June 30
clash in Canton that claimed the man’s life, 75 picketers were arrested, and a
number of people injured, by Guardsmen forcing aside pickets at Republic’s
complex.322  The La Follette Committee deemed the Guardsmen “guilty of
intemperate application of the law.”323  On other occasions, unionists were
arrested in more preemptive fashion—as, for example, on June 22 in Youngs-
town, when police arrested 150 union supporters just as they arrived in town,
and claimed to have warded off another 3,000 supporters.324  SWOC organizers
were often singled out for arrest.325  Overall, according to CIO lawyer Lee
Pressman, more than 2,000 unionists were arrested during the strike, of which
more than nine hundred were charged with “offenses of one kind or another,
ranging from disorderly conduct to kidnapping.”326  Even the survivors of the
“Memorial Day Massacre” (including some men on their deathbeds) were
charged with felony conspiracy before revelations of police culpability led to
the charges being reduced.327  Throughout the strike zone, only a fraction of
those arrested would be prosecuted; however, Pressman asserted that there
would have many more prosecutions had the union not acceded to a practice by
which local authorities ransomed arrested strikers back to the union for set
fees.328  A few unionists did face serious felony charges, including sabotage
and unlawful use of explosives, mostly related to an intense struggle by union-
ists (led by future Communist Party leader Gus Hall) to deter strikebreaking
321 See, e.g., 8 Hurt, 75 Seized in Riot at Canton, supra note 319; Stone 8 Despite Troops at
Steel Mills in Canton, supra note 317; 14 Jailed, 3 Hurt in Mill Gate Clash, YOUNGSTOWN
VINDICATOR, June 10, 1937, at 1; Trouble Flares Again at Canton, supra note 319.
322 8 Hurt, 75 Seized in Riot at Canton, supra note 319; Stone 8 Despite Troops at Steel
Mills in Canton, supra note 317; Trouble Flares Again at Canton, supra note 319.
323 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 325.
324 Russell B. Porter, Invaders Seized, 3,000 Turned Back, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1937, at 1;
Troops Arriving; 5,000 Due; Troops Repel CIO Invasion, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, June
22, 1937, at 1.
325 For example, on July 26, in Cumberland, Maryland, police arrested several high-ranking
CIO organizers outside a Republic subsidiary under a newly enacted ordinance limiting pick-
ets to six and requiring that they be employees of the place picketed. C.I.O. Heads Arrested
at Cumberland, Md., N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1937, at 11.  Similarly, Robert Burke, the
SWOC’s chief organizer at the Republic’s Youngstown Plant—a young man who had
recently been expelled from Columbia University for leading anti-Nazi protests—was
arrested on charges that included disturbing the peace, shooting a man in the leg, and crimi-
nal syndicalism. La Follette Committee Hearings, supra note 224, exhibit 4985, at 12923-
24.  On the dubious nature of the charges and their subsequent disposition, see Burke Is Held
to Grand Jury, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, June 11, 1937, at 1; Burke of C.I.O. Is Fined,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1937, at 16; F. Raymond Daniell, Youngstown Girds for Strike Fights,
N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1937, at 1; Russell B. Porter, Act in Youngstown, N.Y. TIMES, June 11,
1937, at 1.
326 Thomas Committee Hearings, supra note 249, at 4200.
327 F. Raymond Daniell, 900 Chicago Police Guard Strike Area as Riots Are Hinted, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 1937, at 1.  Eventually around sixty were convicted of unlawful assembly and
assessed nominal fines.  61 Memorial Day Rioters Guilty; Fines Are Small, CHI. DAILY
TRIB., Dec. 21, 1937, at 2; Memorial Day Rioters Draw Fines in Chicago, WASH. POST,
Dec. 21, 1937, at 28.
328 Thomas Committee Hearings, supra note 249, at 4200-02; In re Republic Steel Corp., 9
N.L.R.B. 219, 390 (1938).
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and halt production in northeast Ohio.329  Not surprisingly, nowhere were fel-
ony charges pressed against police and company agents.330
The immediate causes of violence in the strike varied.  Violence often
erupted as picketers tried to prevent strikebreakers and supplies from entering
the mills.  Throughout the strike zone, workers engaged in often-chaotic strug-
gles to close off the plants: they sought to set up barricades and check-points on
roads and at plant gates, they tried to block railroad access, they set up “flying
squadrons” of picketers to dispatch to weak points on the lines and respond to
other emergencies, and they tried by numbers alone to block entry to the
plants.331  These efforts led to countless skirmishes with loyal employees, com-
pany guards, and police.332  In other instances, the cause of violence lay even
more directly with the companies and their agents, who mounted premeditated
attacks on strikers, including some instances of sniping or mob attacks, infil-
trating pickets with provocateurs in the hopes of creating cause to attack the
strikers, and, underscored in the deadly clashes, simply seizing on minor inci-
dents as excuses to apply great force.333
Immediate causes aside, though, as the NLRB and the La Follette Com-
mittee understood, the violence was ultimately rooted in the steel companies’
absolute opposition to basic labor rights and their readiness to back this posi-
329 On sabotage cases, see 8 Hurt, 75 Seized in Riot at Canton, supra note 319; C.I.O. Men
Arrested as Warren Bombers; Strike Chief Declared Named in Confessions, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 1937, at 4; see also Hall in Jain, Bond $50,000, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, July 1,
1937, at 1; Judge Lowers Bond for Hall, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, July 4, 1937, at 1.
Other SWOC members and supporters were convicted of obstructing the mails (to prevent
the delivery of food to workers in the plants) and several were sentenced to jail terms. In re
Republic Steel, 9 N.L.R.B. at 389; see also Blocking Mail Charged, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
1937, at 2; Walker S. Buel, Halting of Mail To Be Punished, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, June 19,
1937, at 4; Seek CIO Heads on Mail Charges, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, July 15, 1937, at
1; Wayne Thomis, Arrest 6 C.I.O. Mail Censors, U.S. Commands, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June
24, 1937, at 9.
330 Republic did eventually pay $350,000 in settlement of civil claims involving death and
injury of strikers and strike supporters. GALENSON, supra note 11, at 109.
331 On the union’s attempt to close street access to the plants, see, for example, Autos Crash
Picket Lines, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, June 7, 1937, at 1; Speeding Car Injures 3 Pickets,
YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, June 12, 1937, at 1.  On the union’s blockage of railroad access,
see, for example, Cut Rails After S. & T. Gets Food, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, June 5,
1937, at 1; Pickets Pass Lumber Cars, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, June 13, 1937, at 1; Rail
Men Ask Davey End ‘State of Riot,’ YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, June 7, 1937, at 1; Rail-
roads Sue to Bar Pickets, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, June 2, 1937, at 1; Warren Fight
Threat Passes: Pickets, Republic Men Line Up, but Train Stops Outside Gate, YOUNGSTOWN
VINDICATOR, June 4, 1937, at 1.
332 La Follette Committee Hearings, supra note 224, exhibits 5195-5197, at 13634-743.
333 For example, in Canton, Ohio, company agents repeatedly shot at, rushed en masse, or
threw missiles at strikers. La Follette Committee Hearings, supra note 224, at 13035, exhib-
its 5056F-5056G, at 13139-40; LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 218; Strike Leaders Anticipate
Early Timken Settlement; U.S. Studies Violence Data, CANTON REPOSITORY, June 7, 1937, at
1.  In other instances, strikers discovered company agents in their ranks, who attempted to
provoke the strikers to engage in violence. See, e.g., Interview by C. F. Traynor with John
S. Johns, former Vice-President, United Steelworkers of Am. 8 (1970) (transcript available
at USWA and Labor Oral History Collection, Penn State University Special Collections
Archive); Interview by C. F. Traynor with John S. Johns, former Vice-President, United
Steelworkers of Am. 20 (Mar. 3, 1978) (transcript available at USWA and Labor Oral His-
tory Collection, Penn State University Special Collections Archive).
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tion by force.  If they had abided their workers’ rights under the Wagner Act,
there would have been no strike; and if they had not armed themselves and
local police with lethal weapons and engaged in countless provocations, the
strike would not have resulted in so many deaths and injuries.334
But, as James Rand recognized in his Mohawk Valley Formula, regardless
of the cause, violence played directly to the advantage of the steel companies.
Toward the end of June, episodes of violence and the fervor surrounding them,
combined with the threat of even greater unrest, led the governors of two key
states to intervene in the strike.  Martin Davey of Ohio called up the Ohio
National Guard, and Pennsylvania’s George Earle mobilized the state police.335
In both instances, these forces were initially ordered to maintain a “status quo”
that kept the plants closed, but they were also instructed to dramatically curtail
picketing and, within days, to oversee the companies’ reopening of the mills.336
Clearly, the violence of the strike contributed to a steep erosion in support for
the strikers among the public as well as the political elite, which helps account
for the actions of Davey and Earle.337
Actually, the strike may have descended into violence even if the strikers
had not been provoked by unlawful means.  For even at this early date it was
becoming clear that the steel companies enjoyed the right under the Wagner
Act to run or reopen their mills during the strike, which they all did, if only at
first to demoralize and anger the strikers.  And some of the violence was cer-
tainly attributable to union efforts to counter this.  But in the end, the compa-
nies did not leave it to this dynamic to provoke a level of violence that would
lead to favorable government intervention.  Consistent with Rand’s formula,
they disseminated pamphlets, letters, and statements to employees that charged
the SWOC with domination by Communists, recent immigrants, and blacks;
claimed it harbored a penchant for violence and aimed to exploit the steel
workers economically; and suggested that “outside” unionization threatened the
continued viability of local plants.338  They also used prominent advertisement
firms to coordinate a national campaign against the union.339  Also consistent
with Rand’s formula, in virtually every town affected by the strike, the compa-
nies expended considerable effort organizing back-to-work movements and cit-
334 See generally In re Republic Steel Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 217 (1938); LITTLE STEEL, supra
note 8, at 330-31.
335 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 196-97, 212, 227, 275.
336 Id. at 195; GALENSON, supra note 11, at 104-06.
337 Sofchalk, supra note 236, at 120-36.  On declining support for the union among the
public, see Sympathy of U.S. Voters for Unions Shows Decline Since Big Strikes Began,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, July 4, 1937, at 1.  On criticism of the strikers by prominent
New Deal opponents, see Walter Lippman, The Reaction Against the CIO, YOUNGSTOWN
VINDICATOR, July 1, 1937, at 12; cf. Spencer Fullerton, On the Labor Front: Wagner Act
Brings Disappointments. . .Public Opinion Shifty. . .Labor Prepares to Vote, CLEVELAND
PLAIN DEALER, July 18, 1937, at 5.  On criticisms of the strikers by Wagner Act supporters,
see NLRB ‘Another Way to Spell C.I.O.,’ Says Holt, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1937, at 2 (West
Virginia Senator, and New Deal opponent, Rush Holt); Nye Attacks NLRB as Showing Bias
for Lewis Union, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1937, at 4 (North Dakota Senator and Wagner Act
supporter, Gerald Nye).
338 See, e.g., In re Union Drawn Steel Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 868, 875, 879-82 (1938); In re
Republic Steel, 9 N.L.R.B. at 238-39, 245-49.
339 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 91-93, 320-21.
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izens committees with which they threatened the strikers and offered the steel
workers and the public alike a distorted view of the level of strike support.340
The NLRB would later find that the companies coerced subscription to these
organizations, using methods that included physical threats and intimidating
visits to workers’ homes.341
The immediate impetus in the decision of the governors of Ohio and Penn-
sylvania to intervene in the strike was the threat by the various citizens’ groups
and other vigilante organizations to undertake large-scale, coordinated assaults
on the picket lines.342  Once the governors ordered the mills reopened, the
strike was lost.  With great drama, uniformed police and Guardsmen quite liter-
ally forced aside the pickets to allow the mills to reopen with scab labor.343
They either barred picketing or imposed significant limits on the number of
pickets allowed.344  But by the time the second week of July had passed, the
last mills had reopened, the steel companies were resuming pre-strike produc-
tion levels, and it was clear that the strike had been completely broken.345
Indeed, by August the SWOC had formally called off the strike at all the com-
panies except Republic, where at some mills the pickets lingered on into the
next year, and Republic President Tom Girdler was gloating about how he and
“his men” had won the strike.346
340 Id. at 183-88, 191-96, 209-11, 261-69; In re Bethlehem Steel Corp., 14 N.L.R.B. 539,
613-25 (1939); La Follette Committee Hearings, supra note 224, exhibits 4789-A-K to
4791, at 12152-86, 13064-118, exhibits 5074-A to 5087-E, at 13168-86; BERNSTEIN, supra
note 10, at 491-94; see also Citizens’ Group Hit at Steel Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
1937, at 4; Residents Arm at Johnstown; Ambridge Riot, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 16, 1937, at
3; Vigilantes Rise Up in Strike Areas, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 16, 1937, at 1.
341 In re Republic Steel, 9 N.L.R.B. at 233-35, 252.
342 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 192-93, 227, 263, 275.
343 3,000 More Return to Steel Mill Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1937, at 7; Troops Arrive to
Take Over ‘Danger Zones;’ 3 Mills Open Today, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, July 6, 1937,
at 1; Troops Repulse Hostile Crowds as Workers Leave Warren Plant, YOUNGSTOWN VINDI-
CATOR, June 23, 1937, at 1; La Follette Committee Hearings, supra note 224, at 13380-420.
344 La Follette Committee Hearings, supra note 224, at 13380-420.
345 3,000 More Return to Mill Jobs, supra note 343; Cleveland and Youngstown Steel
Plants Rapidly Approaching Normal Operation; Second Strike Call a Complete Failure,
IRON AGE, July 15, 1937, at 92; Hot Mills Go on at Warren, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR,
July 6, 1937, at 1; Mills Operate at 76 Per Cent, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, July 7, 1937, at
1; More Republic Plants to Re-Open, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, July 6, 1937, at 1; Repub-
lic Reopens Last Struck Unit, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1937, at 2; Sheet & Tube Opens Strike-
Bound Mill at East Chicago, Ind., IRON AGE, July 15, 1937, at 91; Sheet & Tube to Open in
Indiana, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, July 11, 1937, at 15.
346 On the overall sequence of re-openings, see BROOKS, supra note 250, at 144-46, 148-49.
On the persistence of the strike at Republic, see Is Republic Steel ‘Headed for the Rocks?’
STEEL LAB., Sept. 10, 1937, at 3; Strikebreakers, Cheated by Republic Steel, Quit Plants and
Return to Homes in the South, STEEL LAB., Oct. 15, 1937, at 1; Thousands Continue Repub-
lic Strike, STEEL LAB., Mar. 18, 1938, at 6.  On Girdler’s gloating, see, for example, Girdler
Gives Employees Credit for Opening Mills, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, July 12, 1937, at 1;
Strike-Winning Girdler Wonders “Why the Fuss,” YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, July 11,
1937, at 1.  In the last days of July, the SWOC was still hoping that a settlement might be
negotiated with Republic by the mayors of the major mill towns.  Nothing came of that
effort. See Republic Rejects C.I.O. Peace Offer, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, July 30, 1937,
at 2.
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There were surely reasons for the strike’s failure beside the interplay of
repression and violence.  These included the sudden onset of another sharp eco-
nomic downturn that reduced demand for steel, employment needs, and striker
morale.347  The timing of the strike was also poor in that it coincided with a
seasonal slack in demand for steel.348  Ironically, the strike was also arguably
both too broad and too narrow: too broad in that focusing on one company, as
the union had with Jones & Laughlin, might have put that company at a crip-
pling competitive disadvantage; too narrow in that, had the strike been indus-
try-wide, it might have constrained the steel supply and brought pressure from
large consumers of steel.  (In any case, an industry-wide strike was not feasible,
as U.S. Steel, Jones & Laughlin, and other producers were under contract with
the SWOC.)  The SWOC may likewise have been handicapped in some places
by uncertain support from anti-CIO craft unionists among the steel workers as
well as in the local labor councils.349  Moreover, in the heady days after its
victories over U.S. Steel and Jones & Laughlin, the union probably underesti-
mated the basic level of resistance to unionization among the Little Steel
firms.350
Clearly, too, the union initially misread the intention behind and likely
effect of the governors’ mobilization of Guards and state police,351 and it prob-
ably held out too much hope that the Roosevelt administration might intervene
on the strikers’ behalf.352  In fact, there were some desultory efforts by the
federal government to settle the strike.  At one point in June 1937, while the
strike was still raging, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins asked Davey to push
Girdler and the leaders at the other companies for a compromise settlement, but
Davey refused to do so.353  By June 24, mediation efforts sponsored by the
Labor Department had largely collapsed even though an ad hoc committee put
in charge of this effort squarely blamed the steel companies for the strike.354
CIO efforts to get President Roosevelt to back up earlier statements in support
347 GALENSON, supra note 11, at 100; Vigilantes’ Guard Streets of Johnstown, WASH. POST,
June 16, 1937, at 1.
348 Steel Users in Chicago Area Not Yet Affected by Strikes at Mills; Expect Little Difficulty,
WALL ST. J., June 14, 1937, at 2; see also Steel Operations Placed at 84.3% of Capacity,
WALL ST. J., July 27, 1937, at 2.
349 GALENSON, supra note 11, at 101.
350 Sofchalk, supra note 236, at 13-14.
351 Even as late as July, the SWOC’s newspaper continued to speak favorably of such inter-
vention. Gov. Earle Pledges Aid to Bethlehem Strikers, STEEL LAB., July 7, 1937, at 1.
352 On Perkins’ efforts, see GALENSON, supra note 11, at 107-08.  On Roosevelt’s stance,
see BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 713-14; President Quotes, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1937, at 1.
On the other attempts to mediate the dispute, see Davey Works on New Steel Peace Course,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 17, 1937, at 1.
353 Executive Keeps Troops at Plants, WASH. POST, June 27, 1937, at 1; Girdler, Purnell
“Kidnap” Plan Laid to Miss Perkins, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, June 27, 1937, at 1.
354 LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8, at 322; GALENSON, supra note 11, at 107-08; Davey Tells
Guard: Let Mills Open: Republic, Tube Reject Board’s Final Plea to Meet Chiefs of C.I.O.,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 25, 1937, at 1.  Well into early July, the union continued to
press Secretary Perkins to convene a conference to settle the strike, but without success.
Perkins Asked to Call “Strike” Governors, YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR, July 7, 1937, at 15.
On the work of the Board, see Davey Faces Tough Choice if Strike Mediators Fail, CLEVE-
LAND PLAIN DEALER, June 24, 1937, at 1; Taft Calls Strike Board Tomorrow: Mediators to
Meet Here on Steel Tie-up, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 18, 1937, at 1.  On the other
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of the strikers by direct intervention also failed.355  The President abandoned
the strikers to their fate.356
In light of all these factors, it is not clear that the union could have won
the strike even had the companies not opposed the strike in such an aggressive
and violent way, especially considering that the Wagner Act actually did (and
does) so little to diminish the enormous advantage in economic power that
employers enjoy over workers.357  There is a real possibility that the strike
might have been broken simply by a convergence of the factors just mentioned
with the companies’ economic lasting power and their eventual use of replace-
ment workers.  Of course, the companies had no intention of being tested in this
way, and they were not.
D. Violence Elsewhere in the Defense of the Open Shop
The strikes at Remington Rand and in the automobile and steel industries
are among the most vivid examples of organized industrial violence in this
period and they had the greatest influence on labor policy in the years that
followed, but these were not the only industries or firms to rely on such meth-
ods.  Other cases from the period, abundantly documented in NLRB and La
Follette Committee records, illustrate how widespread these practices actually
were.  Although there is not space here to review all examples even briefly,
several bear mention both as illustrations and for their relative importance to
the effort that followed to reshape the labor law.
For example, in 1935, Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting, a company with
lead and zinc mining and smelting plants in Oklahoma, Missouri, and Kansas,
responded aggressively to an organizing drive by the leftist International Mine,
Mill, and Smelter Workers (MM).  MM’s program was aimed at challenging
hazardous working conditions and relentless racial segregation at Eagle-
attempts to mediate the dispute, see Davey Works on New Steel Peace Course, supra note
352.
355 Federal Board of 3 Appointed to Speed Steel Strike Peace; Both Sides Will ‘Co-oper-
ate,’ WASH. POST, June 18, 1937, at 1; National Affairs: Strike, WASH. POST, June 27, 1937,
at 25; U.S. Opens Hearings to End Steel Strike: President Roosevelt Says Steel Companies
Should Sign Contracts, STEEL LAB., June 21, 1937, at 1.  On Roosevelt’s earlier hints at
supporting the union, see also ‘Sign,’ Is Roosevelt’s Hint to Steel Firms, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, June 16, 1937, at 1.
356 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 713; President Quotes, supra note 352.
357 From the outset, the regime enacted by the Wagner Act was saddled by inadequate
remedies.  Most notably, the statute never included any provision for the actual punishment
of employers for their violations of the labor law, no matter how egregious; rather, its reme-
dies were (and remain) limited to “making whole” the victims of employers’ violations and
preventing future violations.  In effect, the only real cost for an employer of denying workers
their rights under the statute is the prospect of having to pay unlawfully fired workers back-
pay (subject to a mitigation requirement) and to offer such workers reinstatement. See
Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10 (1940).  Very early on the statute was also
construed to allow employers to run their businesses during a strike with either temporary (if
the strike is caused by the employers’ violations of the labor law) or permanent replacement
(if the strike is caused by anything else) workers.  NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304
U.S. 333, 346-47 (1938).  The statute did not require employers to close during a strike, no
matter the cause, and it offered workers no other material support during the course of a
strike.
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Picher’s operations.358  When the union launched a strike in May 1935, the
company announced its absolute intention not to deal with the union and then
launched a back-to-work movement of the sort contemplated by the Mohawk
Valley Formula.  It also used its company union to stage huge “pick-handle”
parades and other mass demonstrations of company force.359  The company
organization also led violent attacks on union people.  Numerous union mem-
bers were brutally beaten by company agents, including one whose face was
nearly torn off.360  The tactics broke the organizing drive.361
Similar methods were used by Goodyear in Gadsden, Alabama, to defeat
an organizing drive by the United Rubber Workers of America.  Among the
company’s tactics, which the NLRB called a “series of acts of terrorism,” were
systematic beatings of organizers and union supporters, on some occasions by
mobs under company control, and forcible eviction of organizers from com-
pany property and eventually from the town.  The company also successfully
pressuring the town to enact ordinances giving police the right to enter homes
and arrest people without warrants and prohibiting boycotting, picketing, or
“preaching” violations of the principles of the ordinances.362  In fact, the com-
pany was able to install a number of personnel of its own choosing on the
police force.  Goodyear’s campaign against the union culminated on June 25,
1936, when a mob of several hundred “loyal” employees left the plant and,
variously armed, marched on the union headquarters, sacked it, and beat
organizers after they refused to leave town, all while police stood by pas-
sively.363  A renewed effort by the union to organize in 1937 brought similar
acts of intimidation.364
NLRB records and La Follette Committee investigations confirm that ter-
roristic tactics extended across the industrial landscape of the mid- and late-
1930s, including the coal mining and firebrick industries of central Appalachia,
the industrial agricultural regions of inland California and the Pacific North-
west, the sharecropping areas of the South and Southern Plains, and in many
other manufacturing industries.  In all these places, powerful employers sys-
tematically used violence and threats of violence to ensure their workers would
not enjoy meaningful labor rights.365  Occasionally, determined efforts over-
came such methods, as in the automobile industry; in other instances, however,
as in Little Steel, employers only came to abide their obligations under the
labor law when compelled by other factors, including conditions placed on
lucrative wartime contracts.366
358 The organization created by the company to oppose the MM explicitly excluded black
workers. In re Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 727, 735 (1939).
359 Id. at 744-46, 757-62.
360 Id. at 762-63.
361 See id. at 765.
362 In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 306, 308, 329, 331, 339 (1940).
363 Id. at 344-60.
364 Id. at 321.
365 Taft & Ross, supra note 1, at 221-24.
366 JAMES B. ATLESON, LABOR AND THE WARTIME STATE: LABOR RELATIONS AND LAW
DURING WORLD WAR II 59-60 (1998); see also NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, LABOR’S WAR AT
HOME: THE CIO IN WORLD WAR II 47 (1982).
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IV. OFFENDERS AS VICTIMS: INDUSTRIAL TERRORISM AND THE UNMAKING
OF NEW DEAL LABOR LAW
The violence and disorder associated with employers’ use of terroristic
tactics became in the late 1930s and 1940s the central theme in an aggressive
counterattack on labor rights.  In the courts and in Congress, violence and dis-
order were presented as proof of the irresponsibility of unions and of the
NLRB’s overprotection of labor rights, and thus as evidence of the need to
judicially re-conceptualize labor rights, reform the NLRB, and eventually radi-
cally redraft the labor law.  The authors of this effort—conservative business
leaders, congressmen, and judges—never refuted the central findings of the
NLRB and La Follette Committee that employers were responsible for more
serious violence, that the violence they committed was aimed at subverting the
law, and that these actions together consistently provoked the violence and dis-
order charged to unionist and the aggressive enforcement of the law by the
NLRB.  Rather, the strategy was simply to recast the offenders as victims and
let the violence they authored speak in their favor.
A. A Jurisprudential Framework for Retrenching Labor Rights: Sit-Down
Strikes in the Courts
The Supreme Court did not begin to reckon with the legal implications of
the sit-down strikes until 1939, a couple of years after their height.  Conspicu-
ously, the cases in which the court did so were in many ways conveniently
peripheral to the traditions of employer-sponsored violence that actually
inspired many of the sit-down strikes.  The main case, NLRB v. Fansteel Metal-
lurgical, involved a small rare-metals manufacturer; the other, Southern Steam-
ship v. NLRB, involved a small ocean-shipping company.367  Although clearly
guilty of gross violations of the Wagner Act, neither company had committed
the kind of violence that was common elsewhere, including at other firms in the
metals and maritime trades.  At the same time, the strikes involved in these
cases were not nearly as sensational as the great automobile sit-down strikes at
GM and Chrysler.  Nevertheless, the Court used these cases to develop a juris-
prudence that subordinated the reformist tendencies of Wagner Act to a con-
servative ideology of property and authority.
The factual circumstances of Fansteel and Southern Steamship, as well as
their reactionary jurisprudential legacies, have been described elsewhere and
need only be reviewed briefly. Fansteel arose out of the same organizing drive
that resulted in the Little Steel Strike.  In mid-February 1937, just as the GM
sit-down was ending in victory for the UAW, ninety-five workers at a small
suburban Chicago metals plant seized two buildings in the company’s produc-
tion complex in a final act of protest against the company’s repeated violations
of their rights under the Wagner Act.368  Led by a SWOC organizer, the strik-
ers held the plant for ten days, defying orders to leave the plant, ignoring an
367 Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 31 (1942); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 247 (1939).
368 Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 1938); In re Fansteel
Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930, 939-43 (1938); Transcript of Record at 1878-80, Fan-
steel Metallurgical, 306 U.S. 240 (No. 436).
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injunction and an arrest warrant, as well as a threat of permanent discharge, and
repelling an attempt by a large group of deputy sheriffs to evict them.369  For
its part, the company rebuffed state and federal attempts at mediation.370
Finally, on February 26, a larger force of police overcame the strikers in
“pitched battle” and arrested most of them.371  Several months later, thirty-
seven strikers were tried and convicted of criminal contempt in local court and
sentenced to fines and jail time, with their leaders receiving fairly substantial
penalties.372  After the strike, the organizers amended the unfair labor practices
charges they had earlier filed against the company to include claims about the
company’s conduct during and after the sit-down strike.373  The union also con-
tinued a conventional strike against Fansteel.374  Nevertheless, Fansteel
resumed operations after the sit-down strike with crossovers and replacement
workers and set in place a full-fledged company union.375
The NLRB formally charged Fansteel with a number of violations of the
Wagner Act, including unlawfully refusing to recognize and bargain with the
union, spying on the union, endeavoring to form a company union, discharging
the sit-down strikers and several who aided them for union activity, and dis-
criminatorily rehiring workers who renounced the union.376  The company
claimed its conduct was justified by the illegal and violent nature of the
strike.377  Despite this, the Board eventually found Fansteel culpable of all
these charges and ordered it to undertake various remedial actions, including
reinstatement of most of the strikers.378  The agency invoked the company’s
lack of “clean hands” and its own violations of the law to overcome the com-
pany’s arguments that the strike was illegal.379  The Board also reasoned that
its prerogative to fashion remedies to advance the aims of the law clearly
trumped Fansteel’s post hoc rationalizations.380  The Board in fact went a step
further, stressing that it did not automatically discount strikers’ criminal behav-
ior in deciding whether to order their reinstatement and citing several cases
involving serious felonies in which it had rejected that remedy.381
369 In re Fansteel Metallurgical, 5 N.L.R.B. at 942-43; Transcript of Record, supra note
368, at 1880.
370 In re Fansteel Metallurgical, 5 N.L.R.B. at 943; Transcript of Record, supra note 368,
at 1880.
371 In re Fansteel Metallurgical, 5 N.L.R.B. at 943.
372 Transcript of Record, supra note 368, at 1733-37; Brief of Respondent at 8, Fansteel
Metallurgical, 306 U.S. 240 (No. 436); 3 in Fansteel Sitdown Strike End Jail Terms, CHI.
DAILY TRIB., Sept. 5, 1939, at 13.
373 Transcript of Record, supra note 368, at 23, 32-33; see also Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp. v. Lodge 66, 14 N.E.2d 991, 993 (Ill. App. Ct. 1938).
374 In re Fansteel Metallurgical, 5 N.L.R.B. at 943-44; Transcript of Record, supra note
368, at 1882.
375 In re Fansteel Metallurgical, 5 N.L.R.B. at 943-44, 946-47; Transcript of Record, supra
note 368, at 1897-1900.
376 Transcript of Record, supra note 368, at 26-30.
377 In re Fansteel Metallurgical, 5 N.L.R.B. at 949.
378 Id. at 950.
379 Id. at 949-50.
380 Id.
381 Id.
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The Board’s decision was overturned by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals on nearly every issue.382  This set the stage for the Supreme Court to
decide the case.  For Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, who wrote the
majority opinion, the case hinged on one issue—whether the Board had the
lawful authority to order the strikers reinstated.383  Hughes concluded it did
not; he deemed the discharges totally justified by the nature of the strike: “[I]t
was a high-handed proceeding without shadow of legal right” that gave “good
cause” for the strikers’ discharge unless this was otherwise prevented by the
Wagner Act.384  While conceding that Fansteel had violated the labor law, he
held “there is no ground for saying that it made respondent an outlaw or
deprived it of its legal rights to the possession and protection of its prop-
erty.”385  In Hughes’s view, this fact left intact Fansteel’s “normal rights of
redress,” including the right to fire the strikers.386  He rejected the Board’s
argument that the strikers might nonetheless remain employees under the Wag-
ner Act, and were thus entitled to benefit from the Board’s remedial powers.387
And he rejected the related claim that the Board could nonetheless reinstate the
strikers in the interest of advancing the broader aims of the Act.388  In response
to the Board’s conclusion that Fansteel had discriminatorily rehired those who
renounced the union, Hughes merely appealed to an employer’s inherent right
to decide whom it employs.389  Citing the discharges as evidence that the union
must have lost support, Hughes also rejected the Board’s order that Fansteel
recognize and bargain with it.390
Fansteel established that sit-down strikers are beyond the protections of
labor law.  Somewhat more broadly, the decision endorsed traditional notions
of social order and workplace authority and offered a startling affirmation that
the New Deal had not fundamentally altered the relationship between labor and
capital.  As James Pope has put it, Fansteel verified that “the employer could
violate the workers’ statutory rights without sacrificing its property rights,
while the workers could not violate the employer’s property rights without sac-
rificing their statutory rights—a return to the hierarchy of values that predated
the Wagner Act.”391  Similarly apt is Karl Klare’s judgment that Fansteel
embodies a formalistic and retrograde rejection of the textured realities on
labor relations on which might be based a reformist jurisprudence of labor
382 Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 375, 382 (7th Cir. 1938).
383 NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 247, 252-53 (1939).  Hughes did
not challenge the Board’s findings regarding various unfair labor practices that preceded the
sit-down strike.
384 Id. at 252.
385 Id. at 253.
386 Id. at 254.
387 Id. at 255-57.
388 Id. at 257-58.
389 Id. at 260.
390 Id. at 261-62.  Justices Stanley Reed and Hugo Black dissented on the main question of
reinstatement in an opinion written by Reed that stressed the importance of deferring to the
Board. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone concurred with Hughes on most points. Id. at 263-68.
391 Pope, supra note 12, at 106.
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rights in favor of one that simply valorizes conventional notions of property
and authority.392
Fansteel had immediate and destructive consequences for unionists.  In its
wake, employers fired hundreds of workers whom they accused of engaging in
sit-down strikes.393  They also charged workers with sit-down strikes as a
means of defending themselves against Board orders of reinstatement.394
Often, these strategies worked; the Board acceded to Fansteel and declined
jurisdiction or denied reinstatement.395  But in other cases, the Board properly
rejected such claims as pretexts or mischaracterizations of strike activity.396  In
a few cases, the Board continued to reinstate strikers who left peacefully when
ordered by the police or were denied reinstatement in discriminatory fashion.397
The lower courts for the most part took a more conservative approach, occa-
sionally declining to uphold Board orders in such cases.398
In late 1939, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling that
seemed indirectly to support the Board’s quest for a nuanced approach to sit-
down strikes, union violence, and disorder, more generally.  In Republic Steel
v. NLRB, the court upheld a Board decision ordering Republic Steel to reinstate
Ohio Little Steel strikers implicated in crimes.399  In its decision, the Board had
refused simply to defer to allegations of criminality or violence where such
charges were not backed by guilty pleas or convictions.400  Rather, it ordered
reinstatement for all strikers except those who had actually been adjudged
guilty of serious felonies, basing this decision in part on Republic’s role in
provoking the strike and the fact that it had engaged in acts of violence more
serious than those of the strikers.401  Although the Third Circuit denied the
Board the authority to reinstate those guilty of serious misdemeanors, the
392 Klare, supra note 3, at 323-24.
393 Most notably, two New Jersey companies, Archer Daniels Midland and Mergott, retro-
actively fired several hundred employees for their participation in sit-downs. 50 More Lose
Jobs on Sit-Down Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1939, at 18.
394 See, e.g., In re Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 35 N.L.R.B. 1128, 1132 (1941); In re Ford Motor
Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 994, 999 (1941); In re United Dredging Co., 30 N.L.R.B. 739, 787 (1941);
In re Ford Motor Co., 29 N.L.R.B. 873, 914 (1941); In re Cudahy Packing Co., 29 N.L.R.B.
837, 866-67 (1941); In re Metal Hose & Tubing Co., 23 N.L.R.B. 1121, 1138 (1940); In re
Condenser Corp. of Am., 22 N.L.R.B. 347, 431 (1940).
395 See, e.g., In re Ore S.S. Corp., 29 N.L.R.B. 954, 964 (1941); In re Aladdin Indus., Inc.,
22 N.L.R.B. 1195, 1216 (1940), enforced as modified, 125 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1942); In re
Beckerman Shoe Corp., 21 N.L.R.B. 1222, 1237 (1940); In re Swift & Co., 21 N.L.R.B.
1169, 1188 (1940); In re Reading Batteries, Inc., 19 N.L.R.B. 249, 259 (1940).
396 See, e.g., In re Ohio Fuel Gas, 35 N.L.R.B. at 1136-37; In re Ford Motor, 31 N.L.R.B.
at 1026-27; In re United Dredging, 30 N.L.R.B. at 787; In re Ford Motor, 29 N.L.R.B. at
914; In re Cudahy Packing, 29 N.L.R.B. at 867-68; In re Metal Hose & Tubing, 23 N.L.R.B.
at 1138; In re Condenser Corp., 22 N.L.R.B. at 431.  On this critical tendency by the Board,
see also NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass’n, 310 U.S. 318, 340-42 (1940).
397 See, e.g., In re Stewart Die Casting Corp., 14 N.L.R.B. 872, 896-900 (1939), enforced
as modified, 114 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1940); In re Universal Film Exch., Inc., 13 N.L.R.B.
484, 489-90 (1939).
398 See, e.g., McNeely & Price Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 800 (1938), enforcement denied, 106 F.2d
878 (3d Cir. 1939).
399 Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 1939).
400 In re Republic Steel Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 219, 387-88 (1938).
401 Id. at 391.
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court’s decision upheld the Board’s decision with respect to all the other strik-
ers.402  The Third Circuit’s Republic Steel decision was in definite tension with
Fansteel, for it seemed, unlike Fansteel, to endorse a contextual approach to
strike violence.  This tension would be relieved when a broader and more reac-
tionary reading of Fansteel came to govern cases like Republic Steel and
Republic Steel itself emerged as evidence of the need to reform the law.
The Southern Steamship case also emerged out of continuing conflict
about the extent of labor rights under the Wagner Act, and, like Fansteel, it
also involved a small company in an industry dominated by large firms.  At the
time, Southern Steamship operated seven cargo vessels, mainly along the east-
ern seaboard.403  In early 1938, a CIO affiliate, the National Maritime Union
(NMU), representing “unlicensed seamen,” won an NLRB-sponsored election
at that company and approximately fifty other shipping lines.404  However, like
many other employers, even after the Supreme Court upheld the Wagner Act in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, Southern Steamship refused to recognize and bar-
gain with the union.405  It filed specious objections with the Board contesting
the results of the election and rejected union requests to confer on a contract.406
Finally in mid-July 1938, thirteen NMU members on the freighter City of Fort
Worth gathered on deck and refused to perform their duties until the company
agreed to bargain with the union.407  The captain read them their shipping arti-
cles (traditional individual contracts for shipboard service), declared the strike
illegal under the terms of those documents, and ordered them back to work, but
the strikers remained steadfast and responded by insisting that the law—the
Wagner Act—was actually on their side.408  The standoff lasted until that eve-
ning, when lawyers for the company and the union agreed that the strikers
would resume their duties and the company in turn would commence collective
bargaining and refrain from disciplining the strikers.409  The ship sailed that
night and reached its destination at Philadelphia without further problems, and,
in fact, the strikers’ conduct during the voyage was “exemplary.”410  Neverthe-
less, when the ship made port, the captain fired five of the strikers.411  This led
to a conventional strike by the remaining seamen who had participated in the
Houston strike, and who were themselves then discharged.412
The NLRB eventually charged the company with refusing to recognize
and bargain with the union, interfering with the seamen’s rights of self-organi-
zation and collective bargaining, and discharging and refusing to reinstate the
402 In re Republic Steel, 107 F.2d at 480.
403 Ahmed A. White, Mutiny, Shipboard Strikes, and the Supreme Court’s Subversion of
New Deal Labor Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 275, 318 (2004).
404 Id. at 315, 318-19; In re Southern S.S. Co., 23 N.L.R.B. 26, 29 (1940).
405 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1937).
406 In re Southern S.S., 23 N.L.R.B. at 29-31; Transcript of Record at 705-06, Southern S.S.
Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).
407 Transcript of Record, supra note 406, at 708-10.
408 In re Southern S.S., 23 N.L.R.B. at 33.
409 Id. at 34; Transcript of Record, supra note 406, at 709.
410 Transcript of Record, supra note 406, at 710-11.
411 In re Southern S.S., 23 N.L.R.B. at 35; Transcript of Record, supra note 406, at 711.
412 In re Southern S.S., 23 N.L.R.B. at 35.
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strikers.413  The Board’s decision confronted Southern Steamship’s claim that
the strike was illegal under Fansteel.414  On the one hand, the strike did occur
on the property of the employer and was at least in violation of the strikers’
shipping articles, if not an act of criminal mutiny, which could also not be
dismissed out of hand.415  On the other hand, there were facts in favor of the
seamen: the strike was entirely peaceful; it was never in defiance of an order to
evacuate the ship; the Wagner Act was enacted one hundred years after the
mutiny law and, under it, individual contracts could not negate basic labor
rights; and because the strike took place dockside, it never put the ship or its
crew in any danger.416  There was also the fact that the strike could hardly be
considered trespass to the company’s property, as the ship was the strikers’
part-time home.417  Citing all these concerns, the Board rejected the company’s
claim that it had valid grounds to discharge the strikers and ordered the rein-
statement of the discharged seamen.418
By the time the Supreme Court heard arguments in Southern Steamship,
the United States was fully involved in the Second World War.419  In the
interim, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had largely validated the Board’s
decision and its underlying reasoning.420  At the center of Southern Steam-
ship’s argument to the High Court was the claim that its ship’s officers held an
inviolate authority, codified in the law of mutiny, to control workers aboard its
vessels, and that this authority had been illegally flouted by the strikers and
violated by the Board’s order that they be reinstated.421  These arguments
would carry the day.  Writing for a 5-4 majority, James Byrnes agreed that the
strikers were in fact a dependent class of workers and had indeed committed
mutiny by striking.422  Having established this, Byrnes then declared categori-
cally, and with little but his own judgment to back this, that the Board could not
“accommodate” the mutiny law to the labor law, even if this were necessary to
preserve for seamen a meaningful right to strike.  The right to strike had to
yield.423
Notwithstanding its unique maritime context, Southern Steamship
portended, in two ways, a broad erosion of the right to strike.  First, Southern
Steamship effectively extended the Fansteel prohibition of sit-down strikes to
strikes that do not feature outright seizure of property, violence, defiance of
legal process, or actual prosecution.  Byrnes’s opinion made clear that workers
who engage in such strikes forfeit any right to benefit from Board remedies,
regardless of their actual conduct during the protest.  Second, Southern Steam-
ship expanded the principle in Fansteel that the illegality of a strike necessarily
precludes reinstatement of workers involved in the strike.  In part because the
413 Transcript of Record, supra note 406, at 60-63.
414 In re Southern S.S., 23 N.L.R.B. at 28, 37-38.
415 Id. at 37-38.
416 Id.
417 Id. at 38.
418 Id. at 47-48; Transcript of Record, supra note 406, at 710.
419 Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
420 Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 505, 511 (3d Cir. 1941).
421 Brief of Petitioner at 9, 12-13, Southern S.S. Co., 316 U.S. 31 (No. 320).
422 See Southern S.S. Co., 316 U.S. at 32, 41.
423 Id. at 46-49.
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Board had deemed the discharge of the seamen unlawful in itself, Southern
Steamship more clearly than Fansteel established that workers who engage in
an illegal strike are subject to discharge without this constituting a violation of
the labor law.
Since these cases were decided, the courts have regularly called on Fan-
steel and Southern Steamship to justify further limits that circumscribe the
boundaries of the right to strike, particularly where the Board has attempted to
reinstate strikers implicated in violence, disorder, or affronts to private prop-
erty.424  The most notorious example of this is a case decided by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, NLRB v. Perfect Circle.425  Although the case was
decided before Taft-Hartley gave some statutory license to such a ruling, the
court held that Fansteel required that it overturn the Board’s reinstatement of
four strikers who, in perhaps only the slightest conceivable way, had impeded a
plant manager’s access to company property.426  In cases since Taft-Hartley,
the courts have called on Fansteel and Southern Steamship to bar reinstatement
in all kinds of cases involving worker “misconduct” that otherwise bear little
resemblance to sit-down strikes.  The types of cases include those where work-
ers impugned the value of their employer’s services;427 where they were impli-
cated in trivial acts of picket-line violence;428 where they were provoked to
violent or disorderly acts;429 and where they struck in a fashion timed to
threaten damage to the employer’s plant, even where the employer appeared to
condone the behavior.430
Although typically cited in these cases as a kind of exclamation point to
Fansteel, Southern Steamship has also left its own peculiar legacy in labor law.
The most important example of this is the 2002 Supreme Court decision Hoff-
man Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, in which the Court explicitly invoked South-
ern Steamship (and, more generally, Fansteel) for the proposition that the
Board is without authority under any circumstances to order reinstatement or
back-pay remedies to the benefit of undocumented workers.431  The Court rea-
soned that any other approach would necessarily undermine the enforcement of
the immigration laws.432  More recently, the authority of Southern Steamship
was used by the Board in a different way, more in keeping with its original
subject.  In 2006, the Board cited the cases to justify declining to reinstate
twenty-three fish processors who had been fired for engaging in a strike aboard
424 For cases where the courts have tied their use of Fansteel or Southern Steamship directly
to the construction of section 8(b)(1)(A), section 10(c), or section 13, see, for example,
NLRB v. Blades Mfg. Corp., 344 F.2d 998, 1004 (8th Cir. 1965).
425 NLRB v. Perfect Circle Co., 162 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1947).
426 Id. at 572.
427 Montefiore Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 510, 516-17 (2d Cir. 1980).
428 Schreiber Mfg., Inc. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 413, 414-15 (6th Cir. 1984). But see In re
Schreiber Mfg. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1196, 1197 (1982).  See also NLRB v. Longview Furni-
ture Co., 206 F.2d 274, 274 (4th Cir. 1953).
429 NLRB v. Trumbull Asphalt Co., 327 F.2d 841, 844-46 (8th Cir. 1964).
430 NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 218 F.2d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 1955); see
also NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 213 F.2d 70, 75 (3d Cir. 1954).
431 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151 (2002).
432 Id. at 142-49; see, e.g., Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoff-
man Plastic Compounds, the New Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court’s Role in Mak-
ing Federal Labor Policy, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1, 9 (2003).
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ship—workers whose only resemblance to the seamen involved in Southern
Steamship lay in the fact that they worked aboard a ship.433
B. Sit-Down Strikes, Strike Violence, and the Congressional Attack on the
Wagner Act and the NLRB
By 1938, the Board was vigorously prosecuting cases against the most
prominent practitioners of industrial terrorism, including the Little Steel com-
panies, Ford, and Remington Rand.434  As historian James Gross has shown,
the Board’s efforts in all these cases were about as heroic as legal practice ever
has been, as Board personnel negotiated threats to witnesses and themselves,
numerous dilatory tactics (including attempts of the kind already mentioned to
enjoin their jurisdiction), and pretextual arguments (such as Little Steel’s claim
that it was not obliged to reduce collective bargaining agreements to written
contracts) in order to hold the companies to account.435  Increasingly, these
companies were being held to some account, although only after they had
asserted every conceivable opportunity to appeal the Board’s rulings.436  For
example, the Board would eventually order the Little Steel companies to rein-
state at least five thousand, and as many as seven thousand, workers and pay
hundreds of thousands of dollars in back-pay.437
For a powerful coalition of open shop industrialists, congressional con-
servatives, anti-CIO unionists, and editorialists in the largely anti-CIO main-
stream press, the Board’s aggressive handling of these cases was the most
salient—and perhaps vulnerable—expression of an intolerable challenge to the
prerogatives on which these employers had built their open shops.438  Initially,
these forces mounted a political campaign against the Board, accusing it of
indulging violence and promoting labor rights at the expense of those of busi-
ness.439  However, although it did weaken the Board’s position politically, this
campaign had little apparent effect on its approach to these cases.440  And so
the agenda expanded to encompass either repealing or substantially amending
the statute.
The strategy that emerged to accomplish this was premised on vigorous
investigation of the Board’s handling of these cases in order to turn up material
with which to impugn the agency and the labor law.  At the center of this effort
were lawyers with the Little Steel companies.441  The overall plan has its impe-
tus in the rightward shift of Congress in the 1938 election.  By 1939, Congress
had authorized two investigations of the Board and the Wagner Act—one by
the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, chaired by Elbert Thomas of
Utah (the Thomas Committee), and the other by a Special Committee of the
433 In re Phx. Processor L.P., 348 N.L.R.B. 28, 28 (2006).
434 GROSS, supra note 13, at 16-17.
435 See generally id at 10-19.
436 Id. at 34-39.
437 Transcript of Record at 797-98, Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (No. 14);
BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 727-28.
438 GROSS, supra note 13, at 108.
439 Id. at 39.
440 Id.
441 Id. at 75.
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House of Representatives charged with investigating the NLRB and chaired by
Howard K. Smith of Virginia (the Smith Committee).442
A major focus for both committees was the Board’s handling of the sit-
down strike cases.  The Thomas Committee challenged the Board’s general
counsel, Charles Fahey, to defend the Board’s policy of applying Fansteel, and
likewise to explain its policy on shipboard strikes—the issue that would even-
tually arise in Southern Steamship.443  The committee put similar questions to
Board members and other personnel.444  Board personnel defended these
charges by oral testimony and by submitting to the committee a detailed report
in which the agency attempted to show (1) that sit-down strikes were actually
becoming less common and (2) that even before Fansteel, the Board had con-
sistently treated sit-down strikers as it had others implicated in violence—that
is, as subject to forfeiture of reinstatement rights if their actions were suffi-
ciently egregious or not counterweighted by other important equities.445  Fur-
thermore, in an effort to defend Board decisions ordering reinstatement of
strikers guilty of minor acts of criminality and violence, the report also sought
to distinguish the agency’s approach to conventional strike cases like Republic
Steel from Fansteel.446
For every witness who testified in defense of the Board and the Act there
were others permitted to give contrary, damaging testimony.  AFL leaders con-
tended before the Thomas Committee that the Board’s supposed tolerance of
sit-down strikes was part of program of favoring CIO unions.447  Counsel for
Fansteel itself appeared and argued that the Board’s case against the company
was somehow contrived.448  The Thomas Committee also heard from the head
lawyer with the NAM and the secretary of the Automobile Manufacturers
Association, both of whom presented their constituent employers as innocent
victims of the Board’s sufferance of sit-down strikes.449  Various elected offi-
cials, including Representative Claire Hoffman of Michigan, were also allowed
to make similar claims.450
Such charges of Board indulgence of sit-down strikes were interwoven
with a broader attempt to charge the Board with tolerating and encouraging
other kinds of union-sponsored violence.  Among the witnesses allowed to
press this claim was Walter Tower, a representative of the American Iron and
Steel Institute—the body the La Follette Committee rightly accused of working
with the NAM to coordinate the steel companies’ actions in the Little Steel
Strike.451  In testimony to the Thomas Committee, Tower not only completely
mischaracterized his industry’s opposition to the Wagner Act as somehow an
442 Id. at 103-05.
443 Thomas Committee Hearings, supra note 249, at 425, 2343-46.
444 Id. at 1600.
445 Id. at 467, 482, 523-24.
446 Id. at 523-25.
447 Id. at 1074.
448 Id. at 1927-57, 4517-44.
449 Id. at 2132-33, 2139, 2474, 7455-72.
450 Id. at 63.
451 Thomas Committee Hearings, supra note 249, at 1627-28; LITTLE STEEL, supra note 8,
at 54-56.
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occasion of principled and lawful disagreement,452 but also explicitly appropri-
ated the issue of violence to the industry’s cause.  Tower held the industry out
as protector of employees vulnerable to and victimized by CIO violence on the
picket lines, and Tower described the industry as pushing for changes to the
Wagner Act to protect “employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by
the act.”453  Wrapped up in this was an appeal to the “right to work” as well as
to the “free speech” of employees and employers.454  (However, when chal-
lenged by Allen Ellender of Louisiana on the industry’s massive expenditure on
propaganda and strikebreaking services during Little Steel Strike—again, an
assertion well documented by the La Follette Committee—Tower could say
little).455  The NAM’s lawyer contended that the Wagner Act was flawed by
the lack of a provision dealing with criminality, and that local criminal laws
were inadequate to deal with the issue because they did not apply to the union
itself.456  The same witness argued that the statute needed to be amended to
deny the right to reinstatement—and with this, an effective right to strike—to
those guilty of “violence and intimidation,” as in the Republic Steel case.457
None other than Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, future author of the Taft-Hartley
Act, joined the NAM’s lawyer in this attempt to depict Republic Steel as an
abuse of agency authority.458
Board personnel and CIO officials attempted to rebut these charges.  In so
doing, they faced a rather fraught challenge, if not a trap.  On the one hand, it
would obviously play into their adversaries’ hands to deny that such violence
had occurred—there had been considerable union-sponsored violence in these
cases, particularly those emanating from the Little Steel Strike, in which there
were not only the sabotage cases but also hundreds, maybe thousands, of run-
of-the-mill assaults on company loyalists.459  On the other hand, although con-
fessing that violence had occurred and trying to explain why the Board was
right to reject the view that such violence did not necessarily put workers
beyond the protections of the labor law made for a plausible argument, elabo-
rating such a position could easily give ground to a destructive narrative about
out-of-control unions and an overly indulgent Board.
Nevertheless, Board chairman J. Warren Madden, a contracts professor
and old-style conservative who nonetheless oversaw the zealous enforcement
of the Wagner Act, earnestly denied any undue tolerance for violence or crimi-
nality on the agency’s part.460  So too did the Board’s written report to the
Thomas Committee, which attempted to defend the equity of its position in
Republic Steel against attempts to use the case to justify amending the statute to
expressly bar reinstatement of just about anyone implicated in any strike-
related violence.461  CIO counsel Lee Pressman made similar arguments
452 Thomas Committee Hearings, supra note 249, at 1628-29.
453 Id. at 1634.
454 Id. at 1631-35, 1638-39.
455 Id. at 1641-70.
456 Id. at 2124.
457 Id. at 2124, 2128.
458 Id. at 178-79, 219-22, 247, 273.
459 La Follette Committee Hearings, supra note 224, exhibits 5195-197, at 13645-754.
460 Thomas Committee Hearings, supra note 249, at 295-96.
461 Id. at 467, 489, 520, 523.
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against amending the statute, warning that amending the law to limit violence
would threaten to eviscerate the law’s central commitment to protecting basic
labor rights.462  Equally pertinent was the testimony of Byrl Whitney, of the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, who was among a number of witnesses to
suggest that depriving workers of their rights would actually foment more acts
of industrial violence.463  Even more to the point, Whitney charged that no one
was proposing to broadly divest employers of their rights because of crimes or
violence attributable to a few of them.464
The Thomas Committee heard from numerous witnesses who accused the
Board of impinging on employers’ free speech rights, with particular reference
to how the agency had used statements by the companies to develop cases
against Remington Rand and Ford.465  It also entertained charges that the
agency had behaved in a biased and procedurally improper manner in prosecut-
ing its cases against the Little Steel companies, Ford, and Goodyear.  In partic-
ular, the Board was accused of improperly filing and re-filing charges against
Ford, allowing overly aggressive and biased staffers to press cases against the
Little Steel firms, contriving the signed-contract requirement in its Little Steel
cases, and of general bias against Goodyear.466
Yet again, the Board and its defenders attempted to rebut these charges
without playing into the hands of conservatives.  In its report to the Thomas
Committee, the Board elaborated its argument (eventually endorsed by the
Supreme Court) that the willingness to sign a collective bargaining agreement
was relevant to showing good faith in bargaining, even if the statute did not
ultimately require a contract to be reached, let alone signed, and did not
empower the Board to dictate terms to the parties.467  In a similar vein, the
Board’s report also argued that although the Board did not seek to limit
employer speech as such, it was obliged to assess employer speech as part of it
larger evaluation of whether the employer unlawfully interfered with workers’
rights under the Wagner Act.468  Likewise, Pressman, the CIO lawyer, offered
the committee a statement in which he stressed the “economic background” of
employer “free speech,”—that employer speech could not be properly evalu-
ated when separated from the enormous power that employers wielded over
workers.469  Pressman focused on the Board’s cases against Ford and Reming-
ton Rand, stressing in both cases that Board’s order was directed only at speech
in the context of union election campaigns and did not constitute as much of a
blanket prohibition as the Board’s enemies had implied.470
The Thomas Committee’s investigation was actually somewhat measured
in tone compared to that of the Smith Committee.  The chair, Elbert Thomas,
served on the La Follette Committee and was generally a defender of the Board
462 Id. at 4320-23.
463 Id. at 2652-53.
464 Id.
465 Id. at 72-77, 2084-86.
466 Id. at 66-67, 1663-1760, 1819-61, 1952-53.
467 Id. at 467, 508.
468 Id. at 467, 496.
469 Id. at 4234.
470 Id. at 4234-35, 4238-40.
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and the Wagner Act.  Thomas and other committee members conducted them-
selves in a fairly detached fashion, and Thomas for the most part allowed wit-
nesses on both sides to fully explain their charges or countercharges.  The same
could not be said about the Smith Committee, whose membership included a
number of ardent conservatives beside Smith himself.471  The Smith Commit-
tee actively manipulated testimony and cultivated charges against the Board
and the Wagner Act.  Its investigation of the Board was actually extremely
broad-ranging and involved a meticulous review of Board records, as well as
literally thousands of polls and interviews of people with dealings before the
Board—a classic fishing expedition, abetted by employers and AFL unionists
who resented the way the Board had treated them.472  Again, though, it was the
industrial terrorism cases that provided the committee with the most useful
fodder.
The Smith Committee attacked the Board for the way it fashioned reme-
dies in these cases.  For example, the committee charged the Board with
improperly reinstating arrestees in cases against Ford as well as in the Little
Steel cases.473  One major complaint was that the Board’s effort to cause the
Little Steel companies to reimburse the Works Progress Administration for
relief wages paid to unlawfully discharged strikers was excessive and puni-
tive.474  Clearly, though, the committee’s antipathy went beyond this decep-
tively important concern.  Showing remarkable sympathy for a company so
thoroughly implicated in terrible acts of violence and an extraordinary litany of
violations of the labor law, the committee painted the Board’s “staggering pen-
alty” against Republic as a “reprehensible” “invention” and went on to suggest,
with little actual evidence, that the Board improperly conspired with the CIO in
formulating it.475  No word was paid to the staggering toll that the steel compa-
nies had taken on the strikers—or, for that matter, to the fact that even the
back-pay awards imposed on Republic, which were by far the largest of those
imposed on the steel companies, were rather small in comparison to that com-
pany’s revenues and profits.476
471 GROSS, supra note 13, at 91-93, 151-55, 210-11.
472 Id. at 156-57.
473 National Labor Relations Act: Hearings on H. Res. 258 Before the H. Spec. Comm. to
Investigate the National Labor Relations Board, 76th Cong. 1592 (1939-1940) [hereinafter
Smith Committee Hearings].
474 Id. at 675, 710, 4981.  The Board’s effort was far from implausible, even though it was
eventually rejected by a divided Supreme Court as beyond the Agency’s discretion under the
statute.  David J. Farber, Reversion to Individualism: The Back-Pay Doctrines of the NLRB,
7 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 262, 263-64 (1954).
475 H.R. REP. NO. 76-3109, at 89-90 (1941) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT OF THE SMITH COM-
MITTEE]; see also Smith Committee Hearings, supra note 473, at 675-76, 710, 4981.
476 Although the Board’s back-pay and reinstatement orders against Republic stand even
today as among the largest ever enforced under the labor law, they represent only a small
fraction of the company’s revenue and profit for the year of the strike ($252 million and $9
million respectively) or for the year in which most of the awards were tendered (in 1942,
$521 million and $17 million respectively).  3 HOGAN, supra note 219, at 1239; ANNUAL
REPORT OF REPUBLIC STEEL CORPORATION: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1937,
at 7 (1938); ANNUAL REPORT OF REPUBLIC STEEL CORPORATION: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING
DECEMBER 31, 1942, at 7 (1943).
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Even more pointedly than the Thomas Committee, the Smith Committee
accused a number of Board personnel of bias in their handling of these
cases.The charge was levied at several people, including General Counsel
Fahey, who was accused of being an agent of the SWOC.477  Also accused of
bias was a regional director, whose bias was supposedly evident in angry and
exasperated communications between him and officials at troublesome compa-
nies, as well as from a letter in which he recommended the agency take a more
aggressive approach that would make “Little Steel realize that we are just a bit
bigger than they are.”478  Other personnel, including trial examiners, were also
charged with bias.479  However, the main target was the Board’s secretary (and
later general counsel), Nathan Witt.  The committee charged Witt with commu-
nicating with CIO and SWOC personnel in order to contrive Board cases
against Inland and Sheet & Tube.480  In fact, it seems that Witt actually had
taken extraordinary, ethically suspect steps to expedite cases against the Little
Steel companies, although, as he pointed out, he did so in June as that violent
and chaotic struggle was making a mockery of the Wagner Act’s pretense to
rein in such violence.481
The Smith Committee also accused the Board of improperly investigating
the Eagle-Picher Company prior to charges having been filed by a private
party, notwithstanding the fact that an earlier NIRA labor board had already
started investigating the company when the current NLRB was created.482  The
committee likewise accused the Board of having a general bias against the
company,483 and it accused the Board of improperly formulating the remedy in
the case, which apportioned a lump sum back-pay award among victims of
discrimination.484  Even more remarkable was the committee’s charge that the
Board improperly boycotted Remington Rand’s office equipment during its liti-
gation with the company because of the company’s contempt for labor law, and
had also acted improperly in inquiring with the same motivation about the com-
pany’s entitlement to government contracts, generally.485  Numerous Board
personnel, including Chairman Madden, were interrogated about these
issues.486  Similarly, Board member Edwin S. Smith was charged with public
display of bias against Remington Rand for a speech in which he condemned
the Mohawk Valley Formula.487
The Smith Committee afforded the Board and its defenders less opportu-
nity to rebut the charges levied against the agency and the Wagner Act than did
the Thomas Committee.  Nevertheless, a number of important rejoinders were
477 Smith Committee Hearings, supra note 473, at 3188-89.
478 Id. exhibit 526, at 1920.
479 FINAL REPORT OF THE SMITH COMMITTEE, supra note 475, at 94-95; H.R. REP. NO. 76-
1902, at 41 (1940) [hereinafter INTERMEDIATE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE]; see
also Smith Committee Hearings, supra note 473, at 1891-92 & 2501-02.
480 GROSS, supra note 13, at 176-78.
481 See id. at 177-79.
482 See FINAL REPORT OF THE SMITH COMMITTEE, supra note 475, at 34.
483 See Smith Committee Hearings, supra note 473, at 1853-87, 1985-89, 2038, 2501-13.
484 Id. at 2513-17.
485 Id. at 3361, 3403-04, 4127-28.
486 Id.
487 Id. at 7098.
620 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:561
placed in the record.  The most effective of these were probably offered by
General Counsel Fahey and Chairman Madden, who repeatedly elaborated the
overarching theme that the agency and its personnel had acted correctly
(though not always perfectly) to enforce the law in the face of concerted, often
flagrantly illegal, efforts by very powerful employers to flout the law.488  Like-
wise, the Board’s special investigator, Heber Blankenhorn, aggressively
defended the agency’s conduct of the case against Ford in Dallas, even inter-
rupting the congressmen to point out how outrageous some of their accusations
were in light of Ford’s own behavior in that case.489  Of course, it was obvious
that Smith and a majority of his colleagues were clearly uninterested in any
such reasonable explanations of the agency’s practices.  As Gross puts it, the
Smith Committee was less interested in functional reforms than it was in
reversing a shift in “the balance of power in the American economy”—a shift
that the Wagner Act explicitly sought to accomplish.490  The attacks on the
Board and the CIO and the fulminations about corruption and infidelity to the
law were merely a means to this end.
In some ways, the most notable achievement of the Smith and Thomas
Committee investigations was the enormous negative publicity they were able
to direct toward the Board, the Wagner Act, and the CIO unions.  Not only did
the investigations generate a proliferation of adverse editorials, but there is also
evidence, from Gallup Polling, that they underlay a very significant increase in
support for changing the Wagner Act.491  What is most remarkable about this
campaign is that it was premised on a stunning inversion of the true equities
that characterized these cases and this period of labor relations.  Only a few
years earlier, the legislative debate surrounding the enactment of the Wagner
Act had been preoccupied with demonstrating how employers’ opposition to
labor rights was to blame for industrial violence.  So too, of course, was the La
Follette Committee’s investigation, which by this time was struggling to sustain
interest in and support for its work.492  Smith and his colleagues had managed
to reframe the agenda completely, making the erstwhile offenders in this con-
flict—including some of the very worst practitioners of industrial terrorism—
out to be its victims.  Never mind these companies’ armies of spies and private
militias, the countless physical assaults on unionists, or even their flagrant,
often outrageous (and seldom rebutted) violations of the Wagner Act—the
investigations gave the official sanction of Congress to the view that these
employers were the tragic victims of a conspiracy by corrupt Board personnel
and militant unionists that took advantage of an ill-designed statute to visit on
the companies intolerable affronts to their basic rights as capitalists and prop-
erty owners.
This political coup was all the more extraordinary because it could more
plausibly have been said, in light of the cases examined, that the opposite was
actually true—that the NLRB had been revealed to possess to little authority
488 See generally id. at 2575-2713.
489 Id. at 4267-68.
490 GROSS, supra note 13, at 108.
491 Id. at 187.
492 See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, LABOR AND LIBERTY: THE LA FOLLETTE COMMITTEE AND
THE NEW DEAL 148-50 (1966).
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and that the Wagner Act too weakly protected labor rights.  The CIO’s Philip
Murray was among several witnesses who made exactly this point when, in a
statement to the Thomas Committee, he described how delays in administering
the law benefited the Little Steel companies and how, in the end, the NLRB had
proved nearly useless to vindicating workers’ rights during the actual course of
that contest.493  The NLRB and labor law were helpless to prevent, and unable
to effectively and in a timely way remedy, a strike that was provoked by the
steel companies’ violations of the labor law, that was characterized by
extraordinary violations of workers’ rights, and that was crushed without any
concession to the strikers.  The same point could have been made about the
struggle at Remington Rand, Ford, and many other companies where workers,
often hurt and killed at company hands, waited years for paltry back-pay
awards.494  A more-trenchant question could have been raised about the viabil-
ity of the Wagner Act’s basic scheme, which envisaged that workers would use
an effective right to strike to defend and realize the rights to self-organization
and collective bargaining, and ultimately anchor the statute’s most basic aspira-
tion to redress the fundamental inequality in power in the workplace.495  If
nothing else, the conflicts of the industrial terrorism period proved how easily a
meaningful right to strike could be frustrated if not emasculated entirely.
A second important consequence of the hearings was their contribution to
a dramatic transformation of Board membership and staff verging on an out-
right purge of progressives and radicals.496  This change in personnel was, in
fact, recommended in the Smith Committee’s final report, which charged “a
large group” at the agency with a conception of the “employer-employee rela-
tionship based upon class conflict rather than cooperative enterprise” and pur-
ported to document extensive infiltration of the NLRB by “alien and subversive
doctrines.”497  As documented in James Gross’s history of the Board, this
transformation in personnel immediately diminished the assertiveness with
which the agency enforced the law and put an end to the Board’s efforts, which
were well displayed in many of its early cases, to use aggressive enforcement to
make up for some of the fundamental shortcomings in the Wagner Act itself.498
The change in personnel also accompanied what Gross rightly calls “drastic
493 Thomas Committee Hearings, supra note 249, at 4643, 4646.
494 For example, the Board’s lead case against Republic Steel was actually appealed to the
Supreme Court and reheard by the Board before the Board made its final ruling in the case.
After this the company then appealed once again up to the Supreme Court.  The end result of
all of this was that the Board’s cases against the steel companies for violating the labor law
before and during the strike were not legally resolved until late 1940 and 1941, and the cases
not finally closed until 1942—a full five years after the Little Steel Strike. See generally
Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB 311 U.S. 7 (1940); NLRB v. Republic Steel, 126 F.2d 471
(8th Cir. 1942); In re Republic Steel Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 219, 223-24 (1938).
495 See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 3678 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 20 (1949).  The courts would later affirm it.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 280 (1965); NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361
U.S. 477, 500 (1960).
496 GROSS, supra note 13, at 201-02.
497 FINAL REPORT OF THE SMITH COMMITTEE, supra note 475, at 3-4.
498 See generally GROSS, supra note 13.
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and long-lasting changes in American labor policy and in the administration of
that policy by the NLRB.”499
A third effect of the investigations is that they generated legislation
directed at radically transforming the Wagner Act.  Although these bills were
never signed into law, the lead House bill, the Smith Bill, would survive as a
template for Taft-Hartley.500  Among this legislation’s notable features are sev-
eral provisions that can be traced directly back to the Board’s industrial terror-
ism cases.  For example, the Smith Bill would have amended the law to
explicitly bar the reinstatement of “any employee who a preponderance of the
testimony taken shows has willfully engaged in violence or unlawful destruc-
tion or seizure of property” in the course of a labor dispute.501  The same legis-
lation would have radically transformed the structure of the Board, imposing a
rigorous separation of powers in unfair labor practice cases, making unions
liable for “coercion, intimidation, discrimination, or threats” against employees,
and weakening the concept of the duty to bargain in good faith, on which the
Board had based its argument about signed contracts in the Little Steel cases.502
The Smith Bill passed the House in June 1940, but died in the Senate.503  For
its part, the Senate also generated several bills to reform the Wagner Act, which
in key respects, including issues associated with the Little Steel Strike, roughly
tracked the Smith Bill.504  But this legislation did not advance.  Altogether,
nearly two hundred bills were introduced between 1940 and 1947 to amend the
Wagner Act, all of which failed to overcome opposition from Roosevelt and
loyal New Dealers in Congress, amid the distractions of the war.  In important
respects, however, the die had been cast in the form of the Smith Bill and the
records that accompanied it.
C. Industrial Terrorism and the Shaping of the Taft-Hartley Act
The forces that led to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in the summer
of 1947 have been well documented and need not be discussed here.505  Suffice
it to say, this radical retrenchment of the system of labor rights established with
the Wagner Act represented the successful culmination of a decade-long effort
backed by a very broad coalition of business interests and conservative politi-
499 Id. at 225.
500 Id. at 253-54.
501 FINAL REPORT OF THE SMITH COMMITTEE, supra note 475, at 157-58; INTERMEDIATE
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 479, at 102 (1940).
502 FINAL REPORT OF THE SMITH COMMITTEE, supra note 475, at 159; INTERMEDIATE
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 479, at 101-05; see also GROSS, supra note
13, at 196.
503 Gross, supra note 13, at 210, 225.
504 For a detailed annotation of the Senate bills, see NLRB, REPORT TO THE SENATE COM-
MITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR ON S. 1000, S. 1264, S. 1392, S. 1550, AND S. 1580,
reprinted in Thomas Committee Hearings, supra note 249, at 467.  For its summaries of
issues relative to the Little Steel Strike, see Thomas Committee Hearings, supra note 249, at
489-90, 508, 520, 523-24.
505 See HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-
HARTLEY: A STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS 271-362 (1950).
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cians.506  However, the literature has not adequately emphasized the important
and ironic role that the industrial terrorism cases of the late 1930s played in
framing the legislation and aiding its passage.
There are several linkages between these cases and the Taft-Hartley Act.
As we have seen, the cases were used by the earlier Thomas and Smith Com-
mittees to transform the terms of the debate about labor violence, to establish
that unions were too powerful and too violent, and to legitimate the idea that a
retrenchment of labor rights was a legitimate response to these concerns.  A
more direct linkage can be found in the little-known fact that the Taft-Hartley
Act was substantially based on Howard K. Smith’s 1940 bill and the reports
and hearing records generated in support of it.507  Smith himself not only pro-
moted his old bill as a model for Taft-Hartley, but he also aggressively pro-
moted the idea that the new legislation should feature a more express
prohibition of sit-down strikes with a broader limit on the reinstatement of
workers implicated in violence.508  In fact, Smith was plowing fertile ground;
from the outset, the House hearings on the Taft-Hartley legislation were con-
structed around a supposedly pressing need to redraft the labor law to restrain
labor violence, meaning violence that could be attributed to workers in the
course of exercising labor rights.509  As with earlier congressional attacks on
the Wagner Act, the House hearings invited lengthy and sensational testimony
from business people and industry lawyers about a supposed epidemic of
union-sponsored violence.510  However, neither these witnesses nor the bill’s
champions in the House limited themselves to attacking sit-down strikes or
cases involving actual violence; they extended the line through these supposed
problems to include, as well, more legally and morally ambiguous practices
such as mass picketing.511  In other words, the Board’s supposed indulgence of
sit-down strikes and serious criminality was again subtly transformed into a
broader attack on the right to strike.
Although more tempered in tone that the proceedings in the House, the
debate and hearings on the legislation in the Senate represented more system-
atic and effective explorations of the same themes.  Witnesses there condemned
the Wagner Act not only for failing to restrain union-sponsored violence, but
also for supposedly precluding other, ostensibly reasonable means of dealing
with the problem.512  And more pointedly than in the House, witnesses in the
Senate pressed the idea of broadly limiting the right to strike.513  Among the
staunchest proponents of the view were Charles E. Wilson, the president of
506 See generally, e.g., Steven E. Abraham, How the Taft-Hartley Act Hindered Unions, 12
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1994); Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-Hartley: A Slave-Labor Law?, 47
CATH. U. L. REV. 763 (1998).
507 GROSS, supra note 13, at 253.
508 Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act: Hearings on H.R. 8, H.R. 725, H.R.
880, H.R. 1095, and H.R. 1096 Before the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 80th Cong. 109
(1947) [hereinafter House Taft-Hartley Hearings].
509 Id. at 4-6.
510 Id. at passim.
511 Id. at 2705.
512 Labor Relations Program: Hearings on S. 55 and S. J. Res. 22 Before the S. Comm. on
Labor and Pub. Welfare, 80th Cong. 927, 945-46, 966-67 (1947).
513 Id. at 444-50, 874, 890.
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General Motors, and Ira Mosher, chair of the executive committee of the
NAM.514
The bitter irony of what was playing out—that sit-down strikes and picket
line violence that employers had provoked through their own outrageous and
unlawful behavior were being used to ground a broad attack on labor rights—
was not lost on representatives of the labor movement or on Board personnel.
Walter Reuther, who had been viciously beaten by Ford’s servicemen and
threatened with death by that company’s operatives, attempted to remind the
senators that the sit-down strikes were caused by a “reign of terror” at GM,
characterized by the use of “underworld thugs and gangsters,” and that the
strikes were desperate means of trying to overcome unqualified opposition to
the Wagner Act on the part of GM and other industrial employers.515  Said
Reuther: “I just suggest that you take time to read the hearings before the La
Follette [C]ommittee and find out who was the aggressor on the industrial front
in America in those days.”516  Reuther pointedly accused Congress of cynically
using overblown and de-contextualized assertions of labor violence and law-
lessness to justify dismantling the Wagner Act.517  Other union leaders made
similar arguments, including Hoyt Haddock, executive secretary of the CIO’s
maritime committee, and R. J. Thomas, vice president of the United Automo-
bile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America.518
Paul Herzog, at that time chairman of the NLRB and a relative conserva-
tive on labor rights with very cautious political instincts, argued (correctly) that
the Board had already developed stringent rules for dealing with violence and
lawlessness, and that the bills proposed were not only unnecessary in this sense,
but also threatened to undermine basic labor rights.519  Herzog was particularly
concerned that the legislation threatened to emasculate the right to strike.520
Herzog had given similar testimony in the House hearings, where he pointedly
rejected the accusation, which surfaced repeatedly in both houses notwithstand-
ing its obvious falsity, that the agency was still ignoring the holdings of Fan-
steel and Southern Steamship.521  Just like when it faced earlier charges of this
kind, the Board actually assembled a detailed statement by which it sought to
counter these claims by tracking its own jurisprudence in cases involving union
violence.522
Although overwhelmingly true, these attempts at rebuttal did little to stem
a campaign that was a decade in the making and backed by essentially all the
industrial interests in the country.  The House Report on the legislation simply
reiterated the claim that the Board was not abiding the Supreme Court’s
instructions in Fansteel and Southern Steamship, in particular by failing to
interpret these cases as instructions to deny basic labor rights to workers impli-
514 Id. at 437, 444-50, 927, 945-46, 966-67.
515 Id. at 1276-77.
516 Id. at 1277.
517 Id. at 1276-77, 1286-88, 1296-98.
518 Id. at 1373-75, 2359, 2361-67.
519 Id. at 1901, 1910-11, 1918-25.
520 Id. at 1910-11, 1918-25.
521 House Taft-Hartley Hearings, supra note 508, at 3108-09.
522 Id. at 3180-86.
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cated even the least bit in violence.523  With obvious reference to the Republic
Steel case, the report also claimed, inaccurately, that:
In cases involving violence in strikes, the Board has seemed reluctant to follow the
decisions of the court.  It is inclined to reinstate, with back pay, strikers whom
employers discharge for what the Board seems to regard as minor crimes, such as
interfering with the United States mail, obstructing railroad rights-of-way, discharg-
ing firearms, rioting, carrying concealed weapons, malicious destruction of property,
and assault and battery.524
The Taft-Hartley Act was passed over Harry Truman’s veto on June 23,
1947.525  As our review of the statute’s legislative history makes clear, a num-
ber of provisions in the law were strongly influenced by the effort to turn work-
ers’ responses to industrial terrorism back against them.  The clearest example
of this is the provision eventually enacted as section 8(b)(1)(A) of the current
statute, which deemed it an unfair labor practice for a union or its agents to
“restrain or coerce employees in their exercise of the right” (accorded by
amendments to section 7) to refrain from union membership, as well as limits
imposed by amendments to section 10(c) on the Board’s power to reinstate or
grant back-pay awards to workers fired “for cause.”526  Although not as explicit
or as extreme as the provisions on unlawful concerted activity originally pro-
posed in the House Bill, the section 8(b)(1)(A) and section 10(c) provisions
were also clearly intended to work together to redress the Board’s supposed
infidelity to the Supreme Court’s rulings on sit-down strikers.
The legislation’s proponents made this orientation clear.  Section
8(b)(1)(A)’s ambiguous restrictions on coercion and restraint were fully
intended to prohibit a wide range of conduct, including not only sit-downs
strikes, but also mass picketing and picket-line violence more broadly.527  And
although the final version of Taft-Hartley did not explicitly call for a violation
of section 8(b)(1)(A) to be punished by disqualifying the responsible worker or
workers from reinstatement and only imposed liability on unions and their
agents, the bill’s authors made clear their intention that section 10(c) be read
together with section 8(b)(1)(A) to have precisely the same effect.528  At the
same time, the amended section 10(c)’s limitations on reinstatement and back-
pay were not confined to conduct constituting unfair labor practices; instead,
the provision was intended more broadly to bar such remedies in any case
involving sit-down strikes, strikes featuring violence or criminality, or mass
picketing.529  Whatever the mechanism, the proponents of these changes can-
didly anticipated that the thrust of these limits on Board remedies would be to
deny the offending workers the basic rights otherwise accorded them in section
523 H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 318-19 (1947) [hereinafter HOUSE MAJORITY REPORT ON
TAFT-HARTLEY].
524 Id. at 318.
525 GROSS, supra note 13, at 251, 254-55.
526 HOUSE MAJORITY REPORT ON TAFT-HARTLEY, supra note 523, at 319, 333, 344, 349.
527 MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 505, at 445-47.
528 H.R. REP. NO. 80-510, at 546 (1947) (Conf. Rep.) [hereinafter HOUSE CONFERENCE
REPORT ON TAFT-HARTLEY]; S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 505 (1947) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT
ON THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1947].
529 See HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT ON TAFT-HARTLEY, supra note 528, at 542, 559;
HOUSE MAJORITY REPORT ON TAFT-HARTLEY, supra note 523, at 333.
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7 and section 13.  In fact, for good measure, the drafters subtly transformed the
right to strike language in section 13, qualifying the right as granted by the
Wagner Act with the term “except as specifically provided for herein.”530
The broad intent behind section 8(b)(1)(A) was to prohibit (and prohibit
reinstatement in cases involving) mass picketing, sit-down strikes, and picket-
line disorder generally.531  It has functioned together with section 10(c), to
achieve exactly this purpose.  To be sure, the Board has occasionally given
some consideration to the inherently confrontational and often tumultuous
nature of picket lines as well as the role of employers’ own misconduct.532
However, about twenty-five years ago, in a decision called Clear Pine Mould-
ings, the Board indicated that it would no longer focus on balancing the sever-
ity of the employer’s violations of the statute against the striker’s misconduct,
and that in deference to the spirit of Fansteel and the legislative history of
section 8(b)(1), it would deny reinstatement whenever striker misconduct “rea-
sonably tend[s] to coerce or intimidate employees [including replacement
workers or crossovers] in the exercise of rights protected under the Act.”533  In
Clear Pine Mouldings, the Board also suggested that even mere words, unac-
companied by threatening conduct, could disqualify a worker from reinstate-
ment and, further, that the question of whether other workers were coerced in
the exercise of their right to oppose the union—again, the key question under
section 8(b)(1)—should be addressed at least in part objectively (that is, with-
out exclusive regard to such a worker’s subjective experience of the “coer-
cion”).534  Although the Board later seemed to retreat from the most
reactionary implications of this decision, it continues to deny reinstatement to
violent or disorderly strikers, and it all but categorically bans mass picketing,
even if unaccompanied by much in the way of actual disorder.535
These are not the only important changes in law and policy entailed by
Taft-Hartley the origins of which trace, in part, to industrial terrorism and the
struggle against it.  For example, the drafters of Taft-Hartley inserted a provi-
sion, section 8(c) of the final statute, limiting the Board’s authority to premise
530 29 U.S.C. § 163 (2006).
531 HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT ON TAFT-HARTLEY, supra note 528, at 1, 38–39, 42; MIL-
LIS & BROWN, supra note 505, at 445–47; see also SENATE REPORT ON THE FEDERAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT OF 1947, supra note 528, at 50.
532 This flexibility is embodied in the so-called “Thayer Doctrine,” which contemplates
reinstatement, notwithstanding employee misconduct, where the employer has committed
serious violations of the labor law and the reinstatement would advance the purposes of the
statute.  NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 752–55 (1st Cir. 1954).
533 In re Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1046 (1984) (quoting NLRB v.
W.C. McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2d 519, 527 (3d. Cir. 1977)).
534 Id.
535 See, e.g., In re Detroit Newspaper Agency, 340 N.L.R.B. 1019, 1024-25 (2003); In re
Briar Crest Nursing Home, 333 N.L.R.B. 935, 938 (2001); In re Mohawk Liqueur Co., 300
N.L.R.B. 1075, 1075-76 (1990); In re Chesapeake Plywood, Inc., 294 N.L.R.B. 201, 202
(1989).  On the law of mass picketing, see, for example, In re United Steelworkers, 137
N.L.R.B. 95, 96-97 (1962); In re Local Union No. 5895, 132 N.L.R.B. 127, 128-30 (1961);
In re Local No. 1150, 84 N.L.R.B. 972, 973–79 (1949).  The Board is apparently constrained
in this regard by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Int’l Union v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 640
(1958).
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unfair labor practices on employer propaganda,536 as it had done in several of
the cases featuring industrial terrorism.537  Even more important were dramatic
changes to section 3 and section 10, which radically restructured the Board
itself,538 supposedly with the purpose of preventing “abuses” of the kind that
allegedly characterized the agency’s strident attempts to prosecute the compa-
nies.  Although the precise effect on labor rights stemming from these changes
in Board structure is incalculable, it is clear that they codified a transformation
in the agency’s overall political orientation—investing it with crippling “neu-
trality” that belies the reality of labor disputes.  The changes in the structure of
the NLRB also made it less able to negotiate exactly the kinds of dilatory tac-
tics and fraught and contentious circumstances that defined its prosecutions of
powerful companies like Republic Steel and Ford in the first place.  To make
this point differently, it is actually difficult to imagine that the post-Taft-Hart-
ley NLRB could ever have brought these employers to any account.  Taft-Hart-
ley also added a prohibition on secondary boycotts, section 8(b)(4) of the
current statute,539 which conspicuously foreclosed the kind of broad-based soli-
darity that repeatedly featured in unionists’ struggle against industrial terror-
ism—not least in the Little Steel Strike.  Finally, section 9(h) of the Taft-
Hartley Act essentially barred unions from allowing members of the Commu-
nist Party to hold union office, effectively barring Communists from prominent
positions within the labor movement.540
It should go without saying that the industrial terrorism cases were not the
only impetus for the enactment of Taft-Hartley, and it is similarly apparent that
legislation broadly resembling it may well have been enacted even if these par-
ticular cases had not evolved in the way they did and then been used in the
fashion they later were.  However, the history of the legislation makes even
clearer the central role that these cases played in shaping the legislation and
helping promote its passage, and thus reshaping the legal landscape of Ameri-
can labor relations.  And although it is difficult to attribute broad changes in
labor relations to particular changes in the law (not least because of the need to
account for the effect of social and political factors beside the law and because
the law itself is inevitably both a cause and effect in this dynamic), it seems
certain that the legal changes brought about by Taft-Hartley have played a sig-
nificant role in undermining the strength and vitality of organized labor in post-
World-War-II America.541  In this light, it seems particularly fitting to note that
536 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(c), Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat.
136, 142 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006)).
537 The main examples of supposed abuses by the Board in regulating employer speech
were its cases against Ford Motor and office equipment maker Remington Rand. Thomas
Committee Hearings, supra note 249, at 72-77, 2084-86; SENATE REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1947, supra note 528, at 429; HOUSE MAJORITY REPORT ON
TAFT-HARTLEY, supra note 523, at 299, 324; FINAL REPORT OF THE SMITH COMMITTEE,
supra note 475, at 90-92.
538 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act §§ 3, 10, 61 Stat. at 139, 146-50 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 160).
539 Id. § 8(b)(4), 61 Stat. at 141-42 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)).
540 Id. § 9(h), 61 Stat. at 146 (repealed 1959).
541 On this characterization of Taft-Hartley (and the debate surrounding it), see Lichten-
stein, supra note 506, at 766.
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when Senator Taft visited Youngstown, a scene of violence and bitter struggle
in the Little Steel Strike, soon after the passage of Taft-Hartley, crowds of steel
workers greeted him with vulgar invectives.542
V. CONCLUSION: THE PREROGATIVES OF CLASS VIOLENCE IN
MODERN AMERICA
Writing in 1928, labor historian Selig Perlman famously attributed to
industrial capitalists the prerogative of “a class with an ‘effective will to
power’” in the industrial context—a prerogative, he said, which those who held
it arrogantly justified as something ultimately essential to the public welfare.543
The history of industrial terrorism shows just how complete and how enduring
that prerogative and its justifications actually were.  Even as the Wagner Act,
the New Deal, and the rise of the CIO altered and in some ways diminished the
power of this class, it was able with its allies in government and elsewhere to
turn its own penchant for unlawful, sometimes outrageous violence, to its
enduring political and legal advantage.  What stronger testament could there be
to the prerogatives that this class has retained, notwithstanding the New Deal?
The capitalists’ will to power is embodied today in a softer and more per-
nicious kind of domination of the workplace built much more around profes-
sional management practices, the endowments of the so-called free market, and
the administration of the law.  The kind of over-the-top terroristic methods of
control that were so prominent in the New Deal era have been banished for the
most part to the developing world.  This has left labor law, with its many stric-
tures on labor violence, to preside over a domain of labor relations that is
largely peaceful.
But peace does not mean a robust system of labor rights, let alone justice.
Over the past several decades, unionization rates have fallen below their level
at the time of Fansteel and the Little Steel Strike, major strikes are almost
unheard of, labor standards have retrenched, and capitalists have regained a
level of political and economic power not seen since the New Deal.  This is the
reality of labor peace and the specter that CIO lawyer Lee Pressman had in
mind when, testifying before the Thomas Committee, he angrily challenged the
idea that labor law and the NLRB were overindulgent of labor, in part by ques-
tioning the adequacy of the remedies available to redress the outrageous actions
of the Little Steel companies during the 1937 strike.544 Pressman offered the
senators what may be the single most trenchant summary of this issue under-
pinning the whole question of labor rights in modern America:
It was not the sole purpose of the Wagner Act to diminish the immediate causes of
industrial unrest.  There are worse things than industrial conflict, and one of them is
industrial serfdom, and the poverty, and ignorance, and oppression which have been
the lot of more American workers than we would like to think in recent years.545
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